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IV 
ABSTRACT 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are not only reconciling their diplomatic differences, but 
are also cooperating in numerous areas including oil, trade, and domestic security. Given 
their differences, what forces are lessening tensions and motivating them to pursue this 
new detente? More importantly, what are the implications of this new relationship? 
Shifting political sands in Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 90s, the failure of the 
US "Dual Containment" policy, and the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords are 
bringing the two rivals together. It is, however, Saudi Arabia and Iran's dire economic 
conditions, worsened by the 1998-99 oil price collapse, that forces them to cooperate. 
The main vehicle for Saudi-Iranian cooperation is the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries. 
The Saudi-Iranian detente holds vast implications for oil and stability in the 
region. Their cooperation ensures higher oil prices, which adversely affect the world 
economy. These higher prices, however, salvage both countries' economies, improving 
their domestic stability. The reemergence of Iran onto the Gulf political landscape also 
serves to lessen tensions in the region. The resulting improvement in inter-Gulf relations 
creates possibilities for establishing a stable regional security framework that may affect 
the United States' role in the region. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Given events over the past four years, it seems the Saudi-Iranian "Cold War" is 
thawing for the immediate future. The rapprochement is a major step for Saudi Arabia, 
but especially for Iran given the Islamic revolution's ideological differences with Saudi 
Arabia's monarchy. Yet, after twenty years of hostile relations, often bordering on open 
conflict, Saudi Arabia and Iran are not only reconciling their differences, but are also 
cooperating in numerous areas. The result is an unprecedented series of confidence 
building measures and agreements between the two countries all but cementing their new 
relationship. The most recent and important of these being the mutual domestic security 
agreement signed in April 2001. Given their inherent differences and previous relations, 
what are the forces driving the rivals to cooperate? What is lessening tensions and 
motivating Tehran and Riyadh to pursue this new detente? 
To understand just how far Saudi Arabia and Iran have come in their relations it is 
essential to know where they began. Saudi Arabia and Iran are vastly different nations 
who have different histories, geography, and natural resources. Their people practice 
similar, yet different versions of Islam and they are ethnically and culturally unlike one 
another. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia and Iran's political systems and ideological 
principles are quite dissimilar. These disparities were overwhelming in the past, causing 
Saudi Arabia and Iran to suffer nearly twenty years of cold, even hostile, relations. 
During this period, each regime openly and covertly sought the downfall of the other. As 
a result, the region suffered wars, conspiracies, bombings, and unrelenting political 
tension and instability. Although relations today seem to be on a new path, they remain 
heavily influenced by these factors and Saudi Arabia and Iran's past relations. 
Despite their differences, Saudi Arabia and Iran are seeking common ground for 
improved relations. This cooperation is the result of several contributing factors: 
xv 
• the   election   of   moderate   President   Khatami's   and   the   subsequent 
consolidation of and elite consensus over foreign and oil policies; 
• the increased power of Crown Prince Abdullah and his focus upon regional 
issues and reforming the economy; 
• the failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy to remove Saddam Hussein 
or collapse/change Iran's revolutionary regime; 
• the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords and the perceived failure of the 
United States to pressure Israel into settling the matter; 
Although the above political enablers support the detente, the severe economic decline of 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia is the main force in their rapprochement. Both countries 
suffer from major economic problems such as exceptionally high unemployment, poor 
economic growth, growing foreign and domestic debts, severe annual budget deficits, and 
economies that are overly dependent upon petroleum production. These conditions 
demand a change in the way Saudi Arabia and Iran approach matters of state. Pragmatic 
economic policies designed to maximize oil revenues and salvage both nations' 
deteriorating economies are the basis of the Saudi-Iranian detente and are accelerating its 
growth. 
The detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran holds special significance for the 
United States. The United States, as the largest consumer of petroleum products in world, 
wants affordable oil from the Persian Gulf. No two Persian Gulf countries have more 
control over oil than Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their newfound solidarity, especially within 
OPEC, allows them to affect global oil production and pricing in unprecedented ways. 
The result of this cooperation is the highest oil prices in decades. Additionally, OPEC's 
lower production levels, increased quota discipline, and price bands will ensure oil and 
gasoline prices remain above the previous levels. This impacts the world's economy by 
slowing economic growth. Should higher prices continue to negatively impact the US 
economy, tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia will increase. 
xvi 
Despite the troubles higher energy costs create for the world economy, they do 
benefit the Persian Gulf region by stabilizing its faltering economies. Higher prices 
equate to increased revenues for the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is 
salvaging their failing economies in the short term, while their governments try to 
implement long term economic reforms. Saudi and Iranian domestic stability benefits 
tremendously from improved economic conditions and their stability is vital to the entire 
region. The Saudi-Iranian detente also directly affects regional security by bringing Iran 
meaningfully back into the politics of the Gulf. Iran's reemergence on the Gulfs political 
landscape in turn affects inter-Gulf relations. Iran is establishing closer relations 
throughout the region, defusing past animosities, and disarming potential foes. Iran's 
"charm offensive" increases prospects for establishing a regional security framework 
involving the GCC states and Iran. Should this occur, the continued US military presence 
in the region may ultimately come under increased scrutiny by its Arab hosts. 
xvn 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.        SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Given events over the past four years, it seems the Saudi-Iranian "Cold War" is 
thawing.1 The rapprochement is a major step for Saudi Arabia, but especially for Iran 
given the edict in Ayatollah Khomeini's will which forbid relations with the Saudis.2 Yet, 
after twenty years of hostile relations, often bordering on open conflict, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran are not only reconciling their differences, but also cooperating in numerous areas. 
The result is an unprecedented series of confidence building measures and agreements 
between the two countries that all but cement their new relationship. The most important 
of these initiatives is the mutual domestic security agreement signed in April 2001.3 
Given their inherent differences and previous relations, what is lessening tensions and 
motivating Tehran and Riyadh to pursue this new detente? 
The detente since 1997 is partly the result of shifting political sands in both 
countries. Changes in the leadership of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the mid to late 1990s 
laid the groundwork for the on-going rapprochement. President Muhammad 'Ali 
Khatami's election and his pursuit of a "dialogue among civilizations" were crucial to 
changing Iran's radical image among its Arab neighbors. Crown Prince Abdullah bin 
'Abd al-Aziz's defacto control of Saudi Arabia in turn opened the door for relations with 
Iran. His assertiveness and emphasis upon the independent pursuit of Saudi national 
interests made the rapprochement possible. Although domestic political change in those 
countries sets the stage for improved relations, it is not the driving force. Moreover, while 
1 Analogy borrowed from Kaveh Basmenji, "Ice Age Over in Iran-Saudi Ties," Middle East 
Times, 21 April 2000. Available [On-line]: ' <http://www.metimes.com/2K/issue2000-16/reg/ 
ice_age_over.htm> [26 January 2001]. 
2 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament, (Washington: 
Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989), 16, 28. 
3 "Iran, Saudi Arabia sign iong-awaited' security accord," Islamic Republic News Agency 
(IRNA), 17 April 2001, in FBIS, IAP20010417000099, 17 April 2001. 
1 
the failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy and the collapse of the Middle East 
Peace Accords substantially contribute to the rapprochement, they too are not the force 
driving Saudi Arabia and Iran together. The main force in the Saudi-Iranian detente is 
their dire economic situations that suffered further from the 1998-99 crash in oil prices. 
Concern for their faltering economic situation and its impact upon domestic stability is 
bringing the former enemies together. 
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia suffer from increasing economic decline and 
internal turmoil threatening the two regimes' survival. Throughout the Middle East, oil- 
producing countries realize the oil boom has gone bust. Burdened with large and growing 
populations, Saudi Arabia and Iran's overly oil-dependent economies struggle to 
maintain even minimal annual growth. Low oil prices coupled with high inflation, 
unemployment, and deficit figures severely strain both governments' ability to maintain 
their "social contracts" of state welfare. The 1998-99 collapse of oil prices compounded 
the already poor conditions by dropping the price of oil to its lowest point in twelve 
years. These economic troubles are at the root of growing restlessness and discontent that 
is placing an increasing burden on both Iran's Islamic regime and Saudi Arabia's 
monarchy. Saudi Arabia and Iran realize their overly oil-dependent, centrally managed 
economies and inefficient, corrupt bureaucracies are to blame for most of their fiscal 
troubles. 
Given these dire economic circumstances, both countries generally face three 
options. First, they can institute reforms and cut government expenditures by 
substantially reducing "social contract" services. This choice almost certainly entails 
widespread unrest as the people lose their subsidies and state jobs. Second, they can raise 
government revenues by instituting an effective tax system and or by finding a way to 
raise oil revenues. The adoption and or enforcement of a taxation system will foster 
unrest as the people seek increased political representation and freedom - especially 
versus Saudi Arabia's monarchy. Third, Saudi Arabia and Iran can balance these options. 
Given the repercussions, they have choosen the latter - a combination of boosting state 
revenues through oil price hikes and economic reforms to restructure their failing 
economies. Both countries understand, nevertheless, that such reforms will be 
destabilizing. Therefore, the challenge, especially in light of the 1998-99 oil price slump, 
is to raise oil revenues to a comfortable level and make reforms at a sufficiently quick 
pace to stave off both economic hardship and public unrest. 
To revive and reform their failing oil-based economies, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
must cooperate in oil production. In the past, such cooperation was nearly non-existent as 
both countries espoused opposite production policies. Limited and unsteady oil profits, 
upon which Iran and Saudi Arabia's economies are heavily dependent upon, however, 
plagued both regimes. The further collapse of prices in 1998-99 forced both countries to 
set aside their differences to shore up this vital sector of their economies. As a result, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are achieving an unprecedented level of cooperation within the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This cooperation is the linchpin 
of Saudi-Iranian relations. As a result, OPEC has become the principle vehicle for 
furthering their rapprochement. The detente between the two countries helped to stabilize 
oil prices and, as the world witnessed, enabled OPEC to increase oil prices to their 
highest point in a decade. 
B.        IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
A Saudi-Iranian bloc in the Persian Gulf has a vast impact upon the dynamics of 
the region. Their relations affect not only oil, but also domestic stability, regional 
stability, and the very future of US forces in the region. In the past, poor relations 
between them fostered an environment of tension and conflict. Yet, now, under 
increasing economic and domestic pressure, both Saudi Arabia and Iran can no longer 
afford to be enemies. Iran's revolution and Saudi Arabia's oil boom have run their 
courses and now both countries realize not only how much they need each other, but also 
how much they have in common. An accord between the rivals is proving beneficial to 
both - lessening regional tensions, increasing regional stability, and allowing them both 
to refocus their energies and resources in more positive directions that may salvage their 
economies and regimes. 
The implications of the Saudi-Iranian detente are substantial. The detente between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran holds special significance for the United States and its acquisition 
of oil at reasonable prices. The United States, as the largest consumer of petroleum 
products in world, has a profound concern for both the continued flow of oil from the 
Persian Gulf and its price. No two Persian Gulf countries control the flow and price of oil 
more than Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their newfound solidarity restored both oil prices and 
OPEC's viability as a cartel. The union of Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially within 
OPEC, allows them to affect worldwide oil production and pricing in unprecedented 
ways. As a result, OPEC's "basket" oil price doubled and even tripled during 2000. 
OPEC's lower production levels, increased quota discipline, and $22-$28 price band will 
ensure international oil and gasoline prices remain above the previous levels. This will 
affect the world's economy by lowering economic growth. Should higher prices continue 
to influence the US economy, tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia will 
increase as the US lobbys Saudi Arabia to increase production. 
While the US economy does not benefit from higher oil prices, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran's economies do benefit from higher oil prices. This indirectly benefits the United 
States by contributing to the overall stability of the entire energy-producing region. 
Instability in either Saudi Arabia or Iran has effects throughout the region, creating the 
potential for even higher oil prices. Higher oil costs equate to higher oil revenues 
benefiting the Saudis and Iranian economies. This injection of money helps salvage their 
deteriorating economies in the short term as their governments try to implement long- 
term economic reforms. Since their detente, Saudi Arabia and Iran's economies have 
rebounded and posted economic growth twice and even eight times the previous year's 
numbers. Because of higher oil prices, per capita incomes also increased and both 
governments were able to stabilize their balance sheets. Saudi Arabia even achieved its 
first budget surplus in over seventeen years. The increased revenue has enabled the Saudi 
and Iranian governments to enact some long-term economic reforms without much 
disruption. Despite this positive development, both countries are not proceeding with 
reforms as quickly as they should. In the end, higher oil prices may actually lessen the 
impetus or fiscal pressure for reform. This will only hurt the regimes if oil prices drop. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the detente with Iran lessens domestic instability. 
First, by moving its relations towards Iran, Saudi Arabia distances itself from allegations 
of subservience to the United States and its support for Israel. Saudi relations with Iran 
help to demonstrate the kingdom is independent of US control. This bolsters Crown 
Prince Abdullah's credibility with the average Saudi citizen and with the more extremist 
elements that might otherwise launch potentially destabilizing bombing attacks within the 
kingdom. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Saudi-Iranian detente removes both 
Iranian ideological and operational support for Shi'ah dissidents within the kingdom. 
Without Iranian support, these groups will find it increasingly difficult to acquire arms, 
training, and asylum after their attacks. The detente between the two countries also 
provides a link between the Sunni Wahhabi and Shi'ah cultures promoting peaceable 
relations and defusing Shi'ah discontent. 
The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran holds substantial implications 
for regional stability outside of just securing their own domestic situations. First, the 
detente breaks Iran's isolation, which in the past contributed significantly to regional 
tensions and conflict. The rapprochement with Saudi Arabia brings Iran back into the 
politics of the Gulf. Iran's reemergence increases dialogue, reduces tensions, and 
improves overall inter-Gulf relations. Second, the Saudi-Iranian detente fosters a 
potential framework for meaningful inter-Gulf discussions on such important issues as 
collective security. There are increasing indications improving inter-Gulf relations may 
potentially provide a framework or forum for regional cooperation and dialogue on 
various issues including security. While Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states still 
consider Iraq a threat, they are increasingly open to Iran, especially as a potential 
balancing force against Saddam. There are, however, several GCC reservations or 
concerns, which Iran will have to overcome before those states will enter into more far- 
reaching security ties with it. The Saudi-Iranian detente may also affect the US role in 
maintaining regional stability. In lessening regional tensions and developing a force 
balancing Iraq, the Saudi-Iran alliance may inspire the various host nations to ask the 
United States to withdraw its forces. While at present this is unlikely, improving relations 
among the region's leaders warrant a prudent approach considering this possibility. 
Should the Iranian "charm offensive" prove successful, given the vital roles both 
countries play in the region, the United States will have to consider the changed 
dynamics such a detente will bring. Further development of Saudi-Iranian relations will 
force the United States to reconsider several facets of its foreign policy regarding Persian 
Gulf security, including its policy regarding relations with Iran and its military force 
posture in the region. 
C.   METHODOLOGY 
This thesis provides information and analysis concerning the improved state of 
diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The focus is upon determining those key forces promoting improved Saudi-Iranian 
relations. It assesses the implications, both evident and possible, of such relations on oil, 
Saudi-Iranian domestic stability, and stability in the Persian Gulf region. This 
information aides in the decision-making process regarding US policies in those areas. 
The basis of this thesis is a qualitative analysis of selected primary and secondary 
sources, which record and interpret the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and their 
affect upon the dynamics of the region. These sources notably include official Saudi and 
Iranian statements and news dispatches from the region as translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). This thesis covers this subject in several sections. 
Chapter II of this thesis examines the background considerations, or the factors and 
events perpetuating poor relations between the two countries from 1979 through 1996. 
6 
Chapter III looks at the enabling and driving forces in the rapprochement between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran since the election of President Khatami in 1997. It also looks briefly at 
the dynamics of their relations within OPEC. Chapter IV studies the implications of the 
their new closer relationship upon oil, Saudi-Iranian domestic stability, and the overall 
stability of the region. It also briefly addresses the rapprochement's potential implications 
on US force presence in the region. This thesis comes a close in Chapter V by drawing 
conclusions from the entire work. 
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II.      SAUDI-IRANIAN PRE-CONDITIONS 
Like most nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia view their relations from different 
historic, geographic, religious, ethnic, and political perspectives. These factors have a 
major influence on how the two nations perceive themselves and their roles in regional 
and international affairs. These perspectives are the pre-conditions forming the 
underlying biases and motives each country carries into the relationship. 
A. HISTORIC, GEOGRAPHIC, AND RESOURCE FACTORS 
1. Iran 
Based largely on its sheer size and strategic location, Iran has been historically 
and culturally a dominant power in the region. Iran is the most populous state in the 
region with over 65 million people.4 Iran is also one of the largest (636,300 square miles) 
countries in the region.5 It not only has the longest Persian Gulf coastline (1,100 miles) 
and sits in a commanding position aside the strategically vital Straits of Hormuz, but Iran 
also occupies a pivotal location between the Middle East and West and Central Asia.6 
(See Figure 1) Because of its central location, Iran has been the crossroads of merchants 
and such invading forces as the Arabs, Saljuq-Turks, and Mongols.7 Iran has also, 
however, been the seat of several empires including the Persian Empire and the later 
Sasanian, 
4
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Iran," in World Factbook 2000. Available [Database On- 







 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
chapters 3, 8, 9, 13 passim; and Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the 
Changing Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 26-27. 
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Figure 1. Map of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
8 Middle East (Reference Map) 2000. Available [On-line]: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/ 
PCL/Map_collection/middle_east_and_asia/Middle_East_ref2000.jpg> [29 May 2001]. 
10 
Safavid, and Qajar Dynasties.9 Throughout this period the Iranian people either expanded 
their borders or resisted foreign domination, including Ottoman attempts to subjugate 
them. In modern times, Iran's location between the former Soviet Union and the Gulf 
gave it a vital role in the geo-politics of the British, Soviets, and Americans during both 
world wars and the Cold War.10 As a result, Iran faced foreign intervention in its 
domestic affairs on numerous occasions starting with the nineteenth century British- 
Russian regional rivalry.11 These experiences, especially the 1953 Anglo-US sponsored 
Mossadiq Coup and the United States' subsequently close relationship with the shah, left . 
Iran extremely mistrustful of Western powers and their involvement in the region.12 
Today, Iran's energy resources combine with its key location to provide it with 
renewed prominence in world politics. Iran is relatively rich in energy resources - sitting 
atop and estimated 9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 15 percent of its 
proven natural gas reserves.13 Iran is the second leading oil producer within OPEC next 
to Saudi Arabia and the second largest natural gas producer in the world next to Russia.14 
New discoveries of oil in Central Asia provide Iran renewed importance as the shortest 
overland link between these emerging oil and natural gas supplies and the sea-lanes of the 
Gulf.15 With global energy demand projected to increase between 50 and 60 percent by 
9 Lapidus, chapters 3, 9, 13 passim. 
10 Kemp and Harkavy, 39-60 passim. 
11
 Lapidus, 575-580; and Kemp and Harkavy, 34-37. 
12 For an in depth discussion of U.S.-Iranian relations prior to the revolution, see Barry M. Rubin, 
Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980); and James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New 
Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1988). 
13 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Iran Energy 
Oil Information," (September 2000). Available [On-line]: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html> 
[24 March 2001]. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Hooman Peimani, Iran and the US: The Rise of the West Asian Regional Grouping (Westport, 
CT:Praeger, 1999), 10-11. 
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2020, the Persian Gulf region oil producers must increase production by 80 percent.16 
Given Iran's energy resources and strategic location, Iran will continue to play a vital role 
in regional and international politics.17 
2. Saudi Arabia 
Historically, Saudi Arabia has also been dominant in the region, but because of its 
harsh, desolate terrain and relative geographic isolation on the Arabian Peninsula, it has 
not faced foreign intervention nearly to the extent of Iran. Yet, as the source from which 
Islam arose and conquered the Middle East and North Africa, Saudi Arabia occupies a 
special place in regional and Muslim politics. For hundreds of years Muslims from the 
world have made the hajj to Islam's two holiest sites located in Saudi Arabia, bringing 
millions of foreign pilgrims temporarily into the kingdom every year. It was the twentieth 
century discovery of oil and the later geo-politics of the Cold War, however, that 
expanded Saudi Arabia's importance far beyond the Middle East and the Muslim world. 
Saudi Arabia is the largest (864,900 square miles) country bordering the Persian 
Gulf.18 It is also strategically located within the region, possessing extensive coastlines 
(1,640 total miles) on both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.19 This position provides 
Saudi Arabia with nearly unlimited export facilities for the mainstay of its economy- oil. 
(See Figure 1.) Perhaps most importantly, Saudi Arabia sits atop 261 billion barrels of oil 
or roughly a quarter of the world's proven oil reserves.20 Saudi Arabia is also the world's 
16
 See Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Geopolitics of Energy into the 
21s'Century (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2000), xv-xvi; and DOE, EIA, International Energy Outlook 
2000 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2000), 1. 
17
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meeting the world's future oil needs and argues that sanctions barring foreign investment in their oil 
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18
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20
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largest oil producer, producing over 8 million barrels per day with the capacity to 
produce 10.5 million barrels per day.21 Saudi Arabia is also the fifth largest natural gas 
producer after Russia, Iran, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.22 Because of Saudi 
Arabia's oil production capabilities, it can single-handedly stabilize fluctuations in the 
world oil market; such as it did after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. As such, Saudi Arabia 
plays a leading role in OPEC and the world energy market. The increase in global 
demand predicted for oil over the next twenty years will only heighten Saudi Arabia's 
influence over regional and international affairs. 
B.        RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC, AND POLITICAL FACTORS 
1. Iran 
Religiously, ethnically, and politically Iran is very different from other countries 
in the region. Although religious differences are not the focus of Saudi-Iranian discord, 
they can serve to acerbate other issues concerning national security.23 Iran identifies itself 
heavily with Shi'ah Islam. The official religion of Iran is Shi'ism, in fact Iran is the only 
Shi'ah dominated state in the world. While other regional governments have substantial 
populations of Shfah, even majorities as in Iraq and Bahrain, only Iran is ruled by the 
Shi'ah sect. Iranians have additionally intermingled Persian and pre-Islamic Zoroastrian 
beliefs and traditions into Shi'ism to produce their own brand of nationalistic Shi'ah 
Islam.24 The country therefore has Persian holidays, food, music, dress, and even a 
calendar that are distinctly different from their Arab cousins across the Gulf. 
21
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Revolutionary Iran's fusion of politics with religion accentuated these differences 
in culture and religion. Politically, Iran is vastly different from its Gulf neighbors. After 
the 1979 revolution ousted the country's traditional monarchy, Iran established a 
religiously activist and republican form of government. Iran's espousal of republicanism, 
populism, universalism, and anti-westernism contrasted with their Arab neighbors' 
monarchism, elitism, insularism, and pro-western stances.25 Perhaps most inimical or 
threatening to the monarchies of the Gulf States and Iraq's Ba^athist regime was Iran's 
advocating the export of both its Islamic revolution and its elective parliamentarian form 
of government. In light of these traits, Iran perceived itself as a "true Islamic 
government," ruled by Muslim clerics in conjunction with the people and intent on 
spreading Islam, just as Mohammad had centuries earlier.26 Yet, despite the pious Islamic 
image Iran espoused, its Sunni Arab neighbors saw only Iranian or Persian nationalistic 
ambitions and power.27 Although its revolutionary fervor has attenuated over the past 
twenty years, Iran maintains its religious activism and is increasingly democratic in 
nature. Iran remains a military power in the region, possessing an army larger than the 
other Gulf States (excluding Iraq) combined.28 These factors alone give Iran the 
perception it is the legitimate and dominant Islamic power in the region. 
2. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia on the other hand remains a religiously conservative Islamic 
monarchy under the al-Saud tribe. As the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia directly 
identifies itself with Sunni Islam, specifically the Wahhabi sect that requires particularly 
strict adherence to the SharTa or Islamic code of law. The presence of Islam's two holiest 
25
 R. K. Ramazani, "Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf," in Shi'ism and Social Protest, eds. Juan R. I. 
Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1986), 44. 
26
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sites, Mecca and Medina, within Saudi Arabia provides the kingdom with a special status 
among Muslims. Saudi King Fadh's claim of the title Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn 
(Defender of the Holy Sites) once reserved for the Ottoman Caliph, is central to the 
regime's legitimacy as rulers of the kingdom and is a source of power and prestige within 
international Muslim circles. As a result, Saudi Arabia feels it has a dominant say in 
Islamic issues. For its part in the defense of the kingdom and the holy sites and its overall 
role in the region, Saudi Arabia maintains a smaller, though more technically advanced 
and financially supported military force. To maintain its military force of 162,500 men, 
Saudi Arabia spends more than 15 percent of its annual GDP on defense, more than ten 
times Iran's per capita defense spending.29 While geographically and demographically 
smaller than Iran, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and religious credentials give it a feeling of 
parity, if not dominance, in the region and worldwide. 
C.        PAST RELATIONS 
The above differences and pre-conceptions have led to several confrontations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran since the revolution. The record of these conflicts 
continues to color contemporary relations and demonstrates the sheer magnitude of the 
diplomatic chasm between the two nations. Since the fall of the Shah, relations between 
the two countries have ranged from an initial period of almost open hostility to the recent 
period of seemingly genuine, yet cautious friendship. Iran too often found the pursuit of 
its national interests, specifically oil revenues, inescapably bound up in the maintenance 
of its revolutionary ideals. According to Iranian scholars Shahram Chubin and Charles 
Tripp, the importance to the regime's legitimacy and survival, not necessarily pragmatic 
considerations of Iran's national interests, drove Iran's policy vis-ä-vis Saudi Arabia.30 
Unable to make even the slightest concession to Saudi Arabia, Iran found itself 
increasingly isolated - both politically and economically. Saudi Arabia for the most part 
29
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assumed a reactionary stance, unsuccessfully trying to interpret Iran's intentions through 
Iran's extreme and often contradicting rhetoric. As a result, pragmatic Saudi Arabia drew 
closer to the West for protection and continued to pursue economic policies based upon 
fiscal realities. Since events within Iran largely drive relations, this section focuses on 
Iranian policy and will be broken into two periods covering Saudi-Iranian relations before 
the on-going period of detente. These first two phases demonstrate the gap in relations 
both sides closed since 1997. 
1. 1979-1989 
No period has perhaps more influenced Saudi-Iranian relations than the first 
decade. During this period, both sides formed the initial impressions that still influence 
their decisions. Before the revolution, Saudi-Iranian relations were somewhat 
competitive, but cordial and improving. Barry Rubin records that "the fear of Saudi- 
Iranian conflict [in the 1970s] was exaggerated; Saudi Arabia complained about Iran's 
growing power and ambitions from time to time and noted the shah's hawkish stance on 
oil prices, but relations between them were never angry."31 Towards the end of the shah's 
reign, relations between the two were even improving. By early 1978, officials from both 
nations continued to routinely visit one another and the two nations concluded a security 
agreement dealing with joint.means for combating terrorism, subversion, and crime.32 
Once the revolution began, Saudi Arabia stood staunchly behind the shah, publicly 
announcing their confidence in him and his ability to quell the disturbances, which they 
blamed on communists and leftists.33 Their support for the shah and their optimism for 
the situation in Iran proved misplaced as Iran's revolution succeeded. 
31 Rubin, 142. 
32
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The first decade of Saudi-Iranian relations after the revolution were extremely 
turbulent. From the outset, the anti-monarchial, anti-Western nature of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's movement challenged the Saudi regime both politically and religiously and 
soon destroyed the good relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.34 Even before 
Khomeini seized power, he and his followers were critical of the Gulf monarchies - 
especially Saudi Arabia. David Menashri quotes Khomeini as criticizing Muslim rulers 
like the Saudis for 'living like infidels and animals.'35 Menashri records Khomeini and 
his followers focused upon three facets of the Saudi regime making them 'no better than 
the shah.'36 The aspects they condemned were the Saudis monarchial government, their 
"wasteful use of their oil revenues," and "their 'un-Islamic' ostentatious lifestyles."37 
Menashri even cites one Khomeini aide in particular forewarning an Arab correspondent, 
'Be patient...we will...see the fate of the Saudi rulers six months after our return to 
Tehran.'38 
Although only idle threats before the success of the revolution, Khomeini's 
aggressive rhetoric took on an different context once revolutionaries overthrew the shah 
and Khomeini assumed power. The deposing of Iran's sovereign by a religiously 
motivated population immediately boded poorly for Saudi-Iranian relations. Like the 
monarchs of 18th century Europe panicking at Louis XVFs beheading, from the moment 
the Shah fell the al-Saud royal family feared a similar fate.39 There was a good basis for 
Saudis fear, as Khomeini did not consider the revolution a solely Iranian phenomenon. 
34
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As Iran's supreme leader, Khomeini's scathing rebukes in particular placed Riyadh on 
the defensive. After his victory over the shah, Khomeini not only continued his earlier 
vehement attacks upon the Saudi regime, but also began to openly advocate the 
revolution's export as a means of freeing the oppressed and establishing the universal 
rule of God.40 Attempting to stir such revolt in Saudi Arabia, Khomeini and his fellow 
clerics immediately heightened their attacks on all aspects of the Saudi regime's 
legitimacy and called upon the Saudi people, especially the Shi'ah minority, to revolt. 
Jacob Goldberg cites an example of just such an attack in quoting the following Radio 
Tehran broadcast: 
The ruling regime in Saudi Arabia wears Muslim clothing, but actually 
represents a luxurious, frivolous, shameless way of life, robbing funds 
from the people and squandering them, and engaging in gambling, 
drinking parties and orgies. Would it be surprising if people follow the 
path of the revolution, resort to violence and continue their struggle to 
regain their rights and resources? 
Revolutionary masses, heroic people in Qatif [Eastern Saudi 
Arabia]...resist the government from the deserts where there is neither 
education, awareness nor culture...resist your oppressive 
enemies...challenge the authorities' forces by directing blows at them. 
Where are the arms....Where are the Molotov cocktails prepared by 
. women and children?41 
Such efforts troubled the al-Saud family, which depended heavily upon its religious 
image to maintain a repressive regime similar in many ways to the shah's.42 At its core, 
Khomeini's populist Islam had "no room" for such despotic monarchial systems, which 
40
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he denounced as un-Islamic and 'the greatest disaster that had befallen Islam'43 
Khomeini attacked the Saudi Wahhabi faith calling it an "anti-quranic" and "totally 
baseless and superstitious religion...[that] leads the uninformed and unaware peoples to 
the super powers."44 Khomeini regularly belittled the Saudi regime by referring to it 
simply as the "government of the Hijaz" and called the al-Sauds "traitors" rather than 
"protectors" or "custodians" of Mecca and Medina.45 He also accused Saudi Arabia of 
being the puppet or "arch-agent" of the 'Great Satan' - the United States.46 The extremist 
language of Iran's revolutionary leaders served to reinforce the Saudi perceptions that 
Iran meant Saudi Arabia ill will and fully intended to spread the revolution across the 
Gulf. Such religiously veiled claims only smacked of Iranian imperialism to Saudi Arabia 
and the other Gulf sheikdoms.47 While the existence of a popular revolution within 
another nearby Islamic country was troublesome enough, Iran greatly expanded the gap 
between herself and Saudi Arabia with such drastic rhetoric. 
The Saudi fears of domestic revolt appeared to come to life just as they were 
beginning to absorb the full impact of the revolution in Iran. On 20 November 1979, 
within a week after Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran, Sunni militants 
seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca proclaiming the end of the al-Sauds' corrupt rule and 
the coming of the long-awaited Mahdi. Almost simultaneously, anti-US Iranian inspired 
demonstrations and riots broke out among the Shi'ah in neighboring Bahrain and, more 
43
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dangerously, in Saudi Arabia's eastern oil-rich provinces. Not since the Ikhwan Uprising 
of 1928-29 had the al-Sauds regime been as uncertain of its future as it was during the 
seizure of the Grand Mosque and the subsequent Shi'ah uprisings.48 Saudi King Khalid 
and Crown Prince Fadh sensed the critical nature of the situation and directed the army to 
swiftly quell the revolts.49 Throughout the 1980s, however, Saudi Arabia continued to 
exercise caution, for in addition to inspiring such spontaneous uprisings, Iran also 
supported several organized terrorist groups or cells in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and 
Kuwait.50 In return, Saudi Arabians decided to similarly challenge Iran by supporting 
groups opposed to Khomeini and by backing a coup attempt in the early 1980s.51 
Additionally, Iran's, especially Khomeini's, view of the hajj as a venue for 
political protest against Western influence and the Saudi regime strained Saudi-Iranian 
relations. Several incidents of Iranian politico-religious protest turned violent and bloody. 
One particular incident in 1987, led to the death of about 450 pilgrims and the severing of 
Saudi-Iranian diplomatic ties for four years.52 Such continued Iranian machinations in 
support of dissidents throughout the Gulf, especially in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's 
Shi'ah populations, were a major source of discord between Iran and her Arab neighbors. 
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) heightened the sense of mistrust and hostility on 
both sides of the Gulf. To counter Iran's revolutionary zeal, Saudi Arabia threw its 
48
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support behind Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion of Iran, becoming essentially 
cobelligerents with Iraq.53 Iran saw the "imposed" war as an attempt to combat its 
revolutionary zeal or "snuff out the revolution" entirely.54 Iran perceived itself not just 
the victim of Iraqi aggression, but also Saudi aggression. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, 
Saudi Arabia did everything it could to support Iraq, short of committing its own military 
forces. During this period, Saudi Arabia: 
• allowed Iraq to export oil through Saudi pipelines; 
• encouraged other Gulf States to bankroll Iraq's war effort; 
• led efforts to establish an alliance (the GCC) to counter Iran; 
• enlisted the United States to intervene in the "tanker war" phase; 
• waged economic warfare on Iran by flooding the world market with Saudi 
oil.55 
These efforts influenced the outcome of the war and turned back Iran when it was on the 
verge of winning the conflict.56 
The first decade of relations ended with the death of Iran's chief ideologue, 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini's passing and the sheer strain of eight years of bloody 
conflict with Iraq left Iran tired and less zealous to spread its revolution. Iran found itself 
isolated, financially drained, and deeply mistrusting of both their Arab neighbors and the 
53 For a complete assessment of Saudi support for Iraq, see Dilip Hiro, "Iran-Iraq War," and 
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West. The war demonstrated to Iran how disputes with their neighbors could quickly 
become both "arabicized" and "internationalized," isolating them not only from their 
neighbors, but from the West as well.57 The war showed the leadership in Tehran they 
would not be able to openly impose themselves on other states - they would have to try 
other tactics. 
The same period left Saudi Arabia relieved yet wary. Saudi support for Iraq, 
economic warfare, and growing ties to the United States kept Saudi-Iranian relations 
adversarial despite the passing of Khomeini in 1989. Iran's continued support to Saudi 
dissidents and its inherently anti-monarchial nature also kept Saudi Arabia at arm's 
length. Ironically, while apparently having succeeded in grinding down Iran's 
revolutionary fervor by backing Saddam, Saudi Arabia soon was engage in its own war 
with Iraq. 
2. 1990-1996 
Saudi-Iranian relations went through a period of transition from 1990 through 
1996. The decline of radical and conservative influence over Iranian foreign policy and a 
subsequent shift from the outright hostility of the previous decade to a more moderate 
approach marked this period. According to Iranian academic Hooshang Amirahmadi, the 
shift was the result of several factors. These include: 
• the death of Ayatollah Khomeini; 
• Iran's desperate need for foreign exchange, especially oil revenues, to help 
with post-war reconstruction; 
• the emphasis upon reintegrating into the capitalist world after the collapse of 
Soviet Union; and 
• the defeat of Iraq by a largely Western coalition force.58 
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These factors, especially the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the devastation left by the 
war, ushered in a period of introspection and change within Iranian leadership circles that 
left Iran in a position to redirect its foreign policy course.59 Khomeini's absence led to a 
shuffling of power in Tehran that created changes in the nation's policies. As with other 
areas of policy, foreign affairs became a contest between radicals and conservatives led 
by Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei, and more moderate and pragmatic 
officials under President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.60 At issue was how the 
revolution's ideals were to be adapted to the needs of post-revolutionary Iran.61 
In terms of foreign policy, the contention between conservatives and moderates 
centered on whether the Islamic Republic could resume relations with pro-Western 
Muslim nations to help its economic recovery without sacrificing Iran's Islamic and 
revolutionary values. Pragmatic recognition of Saudi Arabia and closer relations required 
Iran to cease its denigration of the al-Saud regime and Saudi-US- relations and to accept 
the Saudis government's ultimate legitimacy. This hurdle Iran's conservatives were 
unwilling to surmount.62 From their viewpoint, embracing Saudi Arabia was a "slippery 
slope" - tantamount to embracing the "Great Satan" itself.63 Opening up to Saudi Arabia 
was a direct renouncement of the Imam Khomeini's final edict to "always reject, in a 
manner which is worthy of an Islamic government, Taqooti governments, which were 
59
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and are a band of uncultured thieves and empty headed bullies."64 Although Rafsanjani 
tried to adjust the nation's policies, conservative forces remained in charge of the state's 
influential portfolios such as foreign affairs and oil. Consequently, despite the growing 
power of the pragmatists, conservative influences continued to overshadow Iran's foreign 
policy and impair improvements in Saudi-Iranian relations.65 
Iran's inconsistent foreign policy therefore reflected its divided leadership. The 
on-going power struggle between pragmatism and idealism resulted in essentially a 
"dual-policy" in the early 1990s according to Iranian scholar Ahmed Hashim; one 
"wherein the logic of state interests and of the revolution coexisted] uneasily."66 The 
erratic foreign policy decisions this conflict of interests produced, prevented Iran from 
effectively resuming good relations with its neighbors. Consequently, Saudi-Iranian 
relations, according to scholars Chubin and Tripp, "fluctuated between conciliatory 
noises or gestures and fully-fledged campaigns of vitriolic propaganda, as well as direct 
moves to harm each other's interests."67 Despite some promising overtures directly after 
the Gulf War, such as the reestablishment of diplomatic ties, the exchange of foreign 
minister visits, and the resolution of some hajj and oil production issues, Saudi-Iranian 
relations remained weak and troubled. "Crisis-making," "brinkmanship," and 
"ambiguity" came to characterize Iran's foreign policy and ultimately discouraged such 
states as Saudi Arabia from forming any lasting commitments with Iran.68 
Consequently, although the Gulf War provided Iran an occasion to reconcile and 
deepen relations with its neighbors, the opportunity was soon lost. The war/post-war 
64
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westward drift of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States precluded improved Saudi- 
Iranian relations. Because of Iran's preoccupation with the previously mentioned 
preconditions, it continued to demand a central role in regional affairs after the war.69 
Iran hoped its refusal to take sides in the conflict would see it reintegrated back into 
regional politics. Yet, despite Iraq's downfall as the regional balancer and Iran's welcome 
neutrality, the Gulf States instead looked to the victorious United States for bilateral 
security agreements. Although Iran's exclusion from the GCC in 1981 was barely 
acceptable, its exclusion from a post-Gulf War settlement and security arrangement was 
unthinkable and a source of great irritation.70 Iran firmly believed the US presence in the 
region was destabilizing and that only a coalition of Gulf States, including itself and 
perhaps Iraq, could produce a stable settlement. The Saudis' continued massive arms 
purchases from western powers also generated great concern in Iran. 
The reliance upon US protection by the Gulf States was a result of both their fear 
of a resurgent Iraq, but also their continued wariness of Iran. Iran, however, did little to 
help the situation. Its expulsion of foreign workers from and fortification of the heavily 
disputed island of Abu Musa in 1994-95 confirmed Iran's sustained expansionist threat. 
Continued Iranian-inspired hajj unrest, Bahraini Shi'ite uprisings, and Iranian linked 
terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain only worsened the perceived threat.71 
Coupled with Tehran's unrelenting revolutionary rhetoric and support of international 
Islamic subversives and terrorists, Saudi Arabia could not ignore the menace across the 
Gulf. If Iran and Saudi Arabia were to accommodate one another, it would take domestic 
political changes and both sides' recognition of their common interests. This change was 
coming. 
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Continued deterioration of the economic situation in Iran was leading to increased 
unrest. During the early 1990s, discontent with the quality of life in Iran grew. The Majlis 
and the press increasingly voiced their discontent over how the government ran the 
economy. Assassinations and attempts on the lives of public officials, including both 
Khamenei and Rafsanjani, also pointed to the worsening political and economic 
situation.72 The most serious indicators, however, were the growing number of riots, 
public demonstrations, and strikes.73 By 1996, the government in Iran realized 
"something concrete had to be done to satisfy popular expectations and reduce 
discontent."74 Subsequently, Iran began to seek a steadier rapprochement with Saudi 
Arabia. Two major Saudi overtures marked this effort, which largely consisted of 
conciliatory remarks exchanged by officials and the press of both sides. First, Saudi 
Arabia, although loosely implicating Iran in the Khobar Barracks bombing, did not 
officially cite Iran's complicity in the attack. Second, Saudi Arabia gave Iran its support 
for the upcoming 1997 meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) in 
Tehran. Many attributed these acts to Saudi fears of being caught in a standoff between 
the United States and Iran over Khobar and the perception that US policies regarding Iran 
were weakening under Washington debate over the "Dual Containment" policy.75 In any 
case, these acts were the beginning of the stronger rapprochement efforts that continue 
today. 
D.        SUMMARY 
Current Saudi-Iranian relations remain heavily influenced by the various forces or 
pre-conditions that influenced their relations in the past. Iran and Saudi Arabia view their 
72
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national interests from differing perspectives. In considering Saudi-Iranian relations, one 
must look at differences in their: 
respective histories; 
geographical location and natural resources; 
religion and ethnicity; 
political systems and ideological perspectives; and 
their past relations through 1996. 
Relations between the two nations since the Iranian revolution reflect these differences. 
Yet, despite these differences and years of discord, Iran and Saudi Arabia are coming 
together in unprecedented ways. They are doing so to address the most pressing issue 
facing both nations - their dire socio-economic situations. Failing rentier economies and 
growing populations of young citizens create a strain both government's must address. 
Therefore, while the above pre-conditions remain the underlying biases and motives 
influencing how each country ultimately approaches their new relationship, their troubled 
economies drive Iran and Saudi Arabia together. This and other factors in the detente are 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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III.    FORCES IN THE RAPPROCHEMENT 
Given the turbulent nature of past Saudi-Iranian relations and the magnitude of 
the above differences between the two nations, what forces are bringing them together? 
The detente since 1997 is partly the result of shifting political sands in both countries. 
Changes in the leadership of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the mid to late 1990s laid the 
groundwork for the on-going rapprochement. Yet, although political change in those 
countries is the foundation for their improved relations, it is not the driving force. The 
driving force in the Saudi-Iranian detente is their dire economic situations, which the 
1998-99 oil crash compounded. The failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy and the 
collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords contribute to the rapprochement, but the 
regimes' concern with domestic stability is the overriding factor bringing the former 
enemies together. Reviving and reforming their failing oil-based economies necessitates 
cooperation in oil production. They are achieving this through OPEC and this 
cooperation is the linchpin of Saudi-Iranian relations. 
A.        ENABLING FORCES 
While Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia were slowly improving in the 90s, new 
leadership in both countries accelerated the rapprochement. In Saudi Arabia, the transfer 
of power from King Fadh to Crown Prince Abdullah ushered in a new approach to 
regional issues, especially regarding relations with Iran. Likewise, in Iran, the election of 
President Muhammad Khatami heralded major revisions in Iran's approach to foreign 
policy, most notably vis-ä-vis Saudi Arabia. Together, the change in leadership on both 
sides of the Gulf provided the proper political climate enabling the acceleration of Saudi- 
Iranian rapprochement. 
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1. President Khatami 
Politically, the environment in Iran began to change dramatically in 1997. Since 
1989, control of the Iranian government has been a battle between the president, the vali- 
ye faqih (Iran's supreme religious leader), and the various formal and informal power 
structures supporting them.76 As set forth in Iran's constitution, the president is 
responsible for both domestic and foreign policy, but he does not have the authority to set 
the "general guidelines" for the republic.77 That right falls to Iran's vali-ye faqih, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. (See Figure 2.) Additionally, both the president and the vali-ye 
faqih have their own foreign policy organizations that propagate their policies.78 This 
dualistic arrangement permeates Iran's policy-making structures, causing "enormous 
frictional incoherencies in the country's domestic and foreign policy."79 
Figure 2. Iran's Vali-ye Faqih, Ayatollah xAli Khameini.80 
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Accordingly, scholars often lament the above dilemma in Iranian foreign affairs 
and cite it as one of the key problems with Saudi-Iranian relations. Chubin and Tripp in 
their 1996 study of Saudi-Iranian relations opined: 
The struggle for power in Iran, together with the regime's essentially 
decentralized nature, makes for erratic policies.... In reality, Iranian 
'policy' is principally a series of stands and declarations reflecting 
positions congenial to the leadership. It does not reflect a considered 
position related to identified interests, priorities or a cost benefit analysis. 
Consequently, Iran-Saudi relations will continue to be turbulent.81 
Such conditions characterized the Iranian regime's policies from 1989 through 
1996. For Saudi-Iranian relations to improve, fundamental changes in Iran's political 
situation needed to occur. Chubin and Tripp concluded their 1996 work by asserting it 
would take: 
...a significant change in the dynamics of [Iran's] domestic 
politics.. .could precipitate such a change [in Saudi-Iranian relations]. De- 
Islamization or the secularization of foreign policy, with greater emphasis 
on national interests, diminished activism and less posturing in foreign 
relations, would be elements in this change. Greater pragmatism and more 
emphasis on building confidence with its neighbors would be another 
manifestation. The most likely cause of this change would come from 
domestic transformations, such as an increased centralization of power or 
a new national consensus.. ..82 
Ironically, such changes were gathering steam just as their work went to print in late 
1996. 
In 1997, the dynamics of Iran's domestic politics shifted away from the 
conservatives and towards the moderates or reformists. This significant change in Iran's 
political environment was the result of a combination of those very "domestic 
transformations" Chubin and Tripp spoke of above. Increasingly, Iran's electorate is 
81
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composed of young Iranians who have no memory of "Iran's tortured past" and who 
grow disillusioned over their poor economic status and lack of social freedoms.83 They 
perceive rejoining the international community and further democratization as possible 
solutions.84 Consequently, Iranians have increasingly fewer reservations about opening 
up to both forces and are voting accordingly. The landslide election of moderate 
presidential candidate Muhammad Khatami (See Figure 3.) in 1997 and the subsequent 
victories of supporters in local and Majlis elections in 1999 and 2000 respectively, 
represented the groundswell of these electoral forces.85 
Figure 3. Iranian President, Muhammad "AH Khatami.86 
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The election of Khatami, who campaigned on establishing a "democratic peace" 
at home and a "dialogue among civilizations" abroad, and his supporters represented a 
national consensus that the government needed to change its policies.87 The new national 
consensus demanded the government seek an "open society at home and a peaceful state 
abroad."88 The shift in Iran's political dynamics ushered in an era heralding both a more 
concerted and more pragmatic approach to regional and international relations.89 Under 
Khatami, Iran therefore "secularized" its foreign policy, emphasizing "expediency and 
reason," as one Iranian daily commented, to achieve the nation's vital interests.90 Overall, 
Iran is now more concerned with internal stability than promoting instability in other 
Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia. 
The rapid nature of the Saudi-Iranian detente could not occur without Khatami's 
election and subsequent perceptible change in Iran's actions.91 Despite Iran's diplomatic 
openings shortly after the 1990-91 Gulf War, most Arab states remained wary of Iran's 
true intentions.92 Khatami's election, however, altered the perceptions of several key 
Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia.93 Khatami's open rejection of Huntington's 
"clash of civilizations" theory and his advocacy instead of a "dialogue among 
civilizations" opened new doors for Iran's relations around the world. According to 
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Ramazani, Khatami's "moderate foreign policy orientation in general and good-neighbor 
policy in particular resonated well with GCC leaders."94 Nevertheless, the Gulf States 
waited for commensurate changes in Iran's actual policy and operations before jumping 
too deeply into bilateral relations. Within 18 months, Khatami gained control of several 
powerful state portfolios, such as foreign affairs and oil, and was able to then make 
noticeable changes.95 By 1999, Saudi leaders among others began to directly attribute 
several positive trends to Khatami's leadership. These included: 
• an apparent end to Iran's support for overseas assassination teams; 
• a large reduction, if not end, to Iran's support for violent opposition groups in 
the Persian Gulf (no domestic bombings since Khatami's election); 
• fewer Iranian challenges to maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf; 
• an end to anti-Saudi rhetoric; and 
• a major reduction in hajj tensions because of a cessation of anti-Saudi and 
anti-Western demonstrations.96 
Those trends were reflective of visible Iranian efforts to reconcile with their 
neighbors, including: 
• several state visits by Khatami, Rafsanjani, and other prominent Iranian 
leaders throughout the region; 
• a marked increase in conciliatory statements from both moderates and 
conservatives in Tehran; 
• Iranian compliance with OPEC oil production quotas; 
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promotion of several economic ventures with Gulf states including Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait; 
Iran's announced desire to negotiate directly with UAE over the disputed Gulf 
islands; and 
•    the conclusion of bilateral security agreements with several Gulf nations, most 
notably Saudi Arabia. 
Although some, however, could solely attribute these trends to Khatami, it is vital 
to note that conservative forces retain substantial power within the regime. Therefore, the 
shift in Iran's policy regarding Saudi Arabia, while highly dependent upon Khatami's 
conciliatory policy orientation, is more indicative of a consensus among all the factions 
within Iran.97 It seems that in the foreign policy arena, Khatami and Khamenei work 
together in reigning in the more radical voices so Iran's foreign policy remains 
consistent.98 
Although the changed political environment in Iran facilitates the Saudi-Iranian 
detente, it is not the driving force behind the rapprochement. These aforementioned 
factors merely provide a conducive atmosphere for Saudi-Iranian relations. The driving 
force in the detente is Iran's desire to revive their economic situations before it implodes. 
Iran faces severe economic pressures forcing it to look for any solutions it can find. 
Those solutions demand a more pragmatic and open approach to foreign relations. 
Chubin and Tripp accurately predicted back in 1996 that economic troubles in Iran would 
force a change in Saudi-Iranian relations. They wrote: 
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The most likely cause of this change [towards a more pragmatic approach 
to Saudi-Iranian relations] would come from domestic transformations, 
such as.. .a new national consensus resulting from widespread recognition 
of and reaction to the economic penalties of continuing its current 
policies....99 
The "widespread recognition," Chubin and Tripp concluded, might be the result of "a 
sudden economic shock and its political consequences."100 This thesis contends Chubin 
and Tripp were correct in that prediction. The collapse of oil prices in 1998-99 
compounded Iran's already dismal economic situations - generating the "economic 
shock" that drove them to revise their policy vis-ä-vis the Saudis. 
2. Crown Prince Abdullah 
In Saudi Arabia, the political environment began to change with the growing 
power of Crown Prince Abdullah. (See Figure 4.) Since 1998, Crown Prince Abdullah 
has increasingly assumed control over the day-to-day operations of the Saudi government 
from the ailing King Fadh.101 Abdullah's consolidation of power directly coincided with 
the Saudi-Iranian detente and was a boon for their relations. The Saudi public considers 
Abdullah to be a popular leader who espouses both traditional Saudi tribal/Islamic values 
and modern views on reforming the failing economy.102 Additionally, the Crown Prince 
is a strong nationalist who places an emphasis upon the nation's regional relationships. 
Consequently, while he values the strategic partnership with the United States, he puts a 
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priority on the independent pursuit of Saudi national interests in the region.103 He is not 
perceived to be as pro-American as his predecessors for this reason and because of his 
assertive nature and open criticism of US policy in the region.104 According to scholar 
Joseph Kechichian, Abdullah shows a distinct "willingness to follow his own course 
when American and Saudi interests diverge."105 
Figure 4. Saudi Crown Prince, Abdullah bin 'Abd al-Aziz.106 
Some of the keys to the Saudi rapprochement with Iran are Abdullah's energetic 
emphasis upon regional interests and his willingness to "follow his own course." When it 
comes to addressing these issues, the heir apparent is very active. When oil prices 
bottomed out in 1998-99, the Crown Prince spearheaded an industry-wide effort to 
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restore them. In fact, Abdullah is largely responsible for negotiating the March 1999 
production cuts with Iran.107 Abdullah is also the force behind the reforms Saudi Arabia 
is enacting.108 In an unprecedented and now famous speech at the height of the oil crisis, 
Abdullah bluntly stated the glory days of oil were over and everyone, including the royal 
family, must "tighten their belts." Such straightforward talk endears him to his subjects, 
who often resent the royal family's extravagant lifestyles and tire of official statements 
not meshing with their own economic realities. Additionally, the Crown Prince's openly 
critical stance on US policy in the region, specifically regarding its support for Israel and 
continuing military attacks upon Iraq, wins him regional acclaim. His open support of the 
Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians in the peace process is also notable. These actions 
make him particularly popular with his subjects, including the radicals and conservatives, 
who often complain the kingdom aligns too closely with the United States.109 
Correspondingly, Abdullah's rapprochement with Iran demonstrates that he and 
his government set their own political path in opposition to official US reservations about 
Iran. Despite US warnings and past Saudi-Iranian differences, the Crown Prince chooses 
to distance himself from his predecessors' anti-Iranian policies and to instead lead the 
Saudi rapprochement efforts.110 When Iran hosted the IOC meeting in 1997, Abdullah 
not only attended, which was the first visit to Iran in nearly twenty years by such a senior 
Saudi official, but he also met with both Khatami and Khamenei.111 Although this effort 
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may just be part of the Saudi strategy to neutralize Shfah dissidents in the eastern 
provinces or to buoy flagging oil prices, it nonetheless demonstrates a deliberate shift 
away from the United States' position.112 Altogether, Abdullah's actions show a shift 
towards a much more focused approach to regional and domestic issues important to 
Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the assumption of power by Abdullah laid the groundwork 
upon which other forces, namely socio-economic ones, are acting. These other issues 
influence Abdullah's decision to pursue rapprochement with Iran and will be covered 
further below. They are the driving forces behind Saudi and Iranian policy decisions vis- 
a-vis each other. 
B.        DRIVING FORCES 
1. Failure of Dual Containment 
Realist approaches argue the Saudi-Iranian detente is the result of several external 
or international forces. These foremost of these include the failure of the US "Dual 
Containment" policy and the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords. Overall, Saudi 
Arabia, as well as other Gulf states, senses US policy and commitment in the Persian 
Gulf region is wavering. "Dual Containment" of both Iraq and Iran has been a 
controversial policy for the last few years; its effectiveness and continued relevance 
argued by both academics and politicians alike.113 Khatami's election and Iran's 
increasingly pragmatic approach to foreign policy heightens the debate. Many Gulf Arabs 
see the debate in Washington as a sign of "Dual Containment's" inherent weakness and 
waning US resolve and as an overall indication of the lack of rationale for maintaining 
US forces in the region.114 Additionally, US failure to vigorously enforce the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA) further reinforces Gulf perceptions of US indecision. Gulf leaders, 
however, also worry continued sanctions on both Iran and Iraq and "pin-prick" military 
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attacks on Saddam actually harm regional stability more than help it.115 Various 
sheikdoms' additionally fear being caught in a US-Iran confrontation over resurfacing 
allegations of Iran's past links to terrorism.116 In the end, arguments are Saudi Arabia 
realizes either it must be prepared to live peaceably with both Iran and Iraq or it must 
seek to counterbalance one by warming relations with the other.117 In the past Saudi 
Arabia sought regional balance by playing Iraq against Iran. Since that is no longer an 
option and the US policy is in doubt, the Saudis are looking to Iran to balance Iraq. "If 
the United States cannot get rid of Saddam, then Saudi Arabia will have to make local 
arrangements, at least in the short term."118 Therefore, in the end, it is the United States' 
apparent inability to remove Saddam Hussein that "only strengthens the emerging Saudi- 
Iranian rapprochement, [and] enhances OPEC solidarity...."119 
2. Failure of the Middle East Peace Accords 
While the failure of "Dual Containment" contributed to the shift in relations, the 
collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords was also a factor in the Saudi-Iranian 
rapprochement. When the peace talks stalled in 1998 and the United States failed to 
pressure Israel harder to achieve a settlement, it was widely perceived in the Arab world 
as support for Israel's position. This perceived bias immediately increased already 
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widespread disillusionment with the United States and its role in regional affairs.120 
Subsequently, the United States' inability to thwart the collapse of the accords or the 
escalating Israeli-Palestinian violence further irritated Arab sensibilities and promoted a 
"rising tide of anti-Americanism" in the Middle East.121 This creates strong political 
pressure on governments, such as Saudi Arabia, who maintain close relations with the 
United States and who also need to protect the public legitimacy of their rule.122 Anti-US 
demonstrations and sentiment urge regional leaders to at least publicly denounce US 
support for Israel as many did at the November 2000 Islamic Summit in Qatar.123 Saudi 
Arabia was one of the countries that spoke out against the alleged US support of Israel. 
Additionally, Crown Prince Abdullah's often public criticism of the United States for its 
policies regarding Israel is well known.124 This general disillusionment with US policies 
undermines its influence in the Persian Gulf and ultimately is pushing the Gulf States 
toward Iran.125 Iran for its part realizes this and makes every effort to capitalize upon the 
Arabs' frustration. At the Qatar summit, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi remarked, 
"Iranian arguments are getting more support. The way the Americans have dealt with the 
peace process has made people dissatisfied."126 In this light, closer ties with Iran are a 
clear rejection of the United States and thus a means of establishing a degree of political 
independence that helps defuse public outcry against relations with America. 
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3. "Janus-Faced" Security Dilemmas 
From a realist or neorealist point of view, the collapse of "Dual Containment" 
might fully account for the Saudi-Iranian detente. Such interpretations, nevertheless, fall 
short because they do not account for the other driving force in Middle East politics - 
domestic stability. Conventionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran are both relatively secure from 
foreign attack, but the real trouble lies beneath the surface in their domestic situations.127 
Besides international concerns, states like Saudi Arabia and Iran also balance domestic • 
concerns that more directly threaten their regimes' survival on a daily basis. Saudi Arabia 
and Iran must face both internal and external threats equally in what Michael Barnett 
calls the "Janus-faced" dilemma.128 They are "concerned with challenges in both the 
domestic and the international arenas."129 In this struggle to maintain control on both 
fronts, however, Barnett argues governments will chose domestic stability over national 
security even if it makes them vulnerable in that area.130 Gregory Gause agrees, writing, 
"it is regime security, not simply state security, that animate decision makers in the 
region."131 In this vein, one could explain the various Arab leaders' anti-US statements as 
means of defusing rising political tensions that could threaten their regimes' security. The 
threat to their regimes, however, comes from a much more pervasive source - their 
economies. 
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States like Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose domestic policies and options are 
constrained by their "social contracts" and rentier economies, face increased difficulty 
meeting the security challenge. Such states, Barnett finds, can turn to restructuring 
solutions to bolster their ability to meet national security concerns.132 Yet, because of the 
domestic unrest restructuring their economies and "social contracts" entails, states often 
must turn to international solutions to simultaneously balance their domestic and national 
security concerns.133 "The more constrained the state is by its relations with its economy 
and society, the more it will emphasize international strategies of adjustment."134 Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are constrained by their economies and societies. While Saudi Arabia and 
Iran attempt to restructure their economies and "social contracts," they will encounter 
substantial domestic unrest. Therefore, to maintain their domestic and national security, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are balancing their restructuring efforts with international 
solutions. Their rapprochement is just such a solution. Saudi Arabia and Iran's miserable 
economic conditions, compounded by demographic explosions are forcing the two 
nations together to balance the competing goals of national and domestic security. This 
international solution is enshrined in their detente and most notably in their relations 
within OPEC. 
4. Troubled Economic Situations 
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia face dismal economic conditions and future 
predictions. The oil-based economies Abdullah and Khatami inherited in the mid-1990s 
suffer from mismanagement and corruption, an excessively large and inefficient public 
sector, and macroeconomic imbalances. Major demographic changes and the economy's 
heavy reliance upon oil revenues compound these problems. 
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On March 15, 1998, President Khatami made a televised address to the 
Iranian people characterizing Iran's economy as "sick." Despite the accurate diagnosis, 
however, the reformer's recovery plan ironically failed to provide for an adequate cure. 
The precipitous drop in oil prices in 1998 caused Iran's internal and external fiscal 
positions to deteriorate sharply. According to Middle East economist Jahangir Amuzegar, 
"By the spring of 1998, economic troubles [in Iran] reached a critical mass."135 The real 
GDP declined to 2.1 percent from 3.1 percent the previous year and inflation reached 20 
percent.136 Unemployment was rampant and the Iranian rial was in a free fall against the 
dollar.137 Disappointingly, Khatami's economic roadmap for his administration lacked 
substance and detail. According to Amuzegar, Khatami's plan addressed the 
aforementioned problems and others such as "inadequate aggregate investment, heavy 
dependence on oil export revenues, harmful public and parastatal [sic] monopolies, 
excessive bureaucratic regulation, low productivity, and widespread poverty."138 The 
plan, however, did not provide enough remedies and instead defended some of the 
economy's most inefficient policies, such as subsidies.139 Because of the plan's failure 
and low oil prices in 1998, Iran's economy only worsened. 
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Today, Iran is the most populated state in the region and it is one of the 
poorest.140 By all accounts, Iran continues to have a troubled economic situation. In mid 
1999, Amuzegar asserted Iran's so-called "misery index" (the combination of inflation 
and unemployment) was at its highest point since the revolution.141 With inflation and 
unemployment still at near record levels, Amuzegar's observation remains just as true in 
2001. Iran's "misery index" is a direct reflection of more troubling structural forces 
holding back Iran's prosperity. According to Amuzegar, the foremost of these include: 
• constitutional mandates for wholesale nationalization of crucial 
economic activity, and a cradle-to-grave welfare system that 





a large, overstaffed, under funded, inefficient, and corruption- 
ridden public sector, overly dependent upon oil export incomes for 
both foreign exchange and budget needs; 
a bloated bureaucracy headed mostly by incompetent Islamic 
loyalists and inept executives, and given extraordinary (and often 
unchecked) power to act through a multitude of regular and 
revolutionary institutions; 
the absence of a cohesive employment policy with respect to both 
job opportunities and needed skills; 
a mistaken capital-intensive industrial policy, absorbing the bulk of 
public capital outlays without generating sufficient employment 
opportunities for the growing entrants in the labor market; 
an inefficient and costly agricultural policy aimed at self- 
sufficiency on "strategic grounds," devoid of both economic 
justification and national security guarantees; 
a badly botched structural adjustment and liberalization strategy 
during the 1989-1997 period, having spawned "crony capitalism," 
enriched both the free-wheeling bonyads (charitable foundations) 
and the well-connected apparatchiks - thus widening the income 
gap; 
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• a fast dwindling middle-class of professional cadres and business 
entrepreneurs sorely needed to invigorate and expand the private 
sector; and 
• lack of transparency in the operations and accounts of public 
agencies and parastatal institutions - making the examination and 
analysis of available data and policy initiatives exceedingly 
difficult.142 
Like Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states, the most critical 
structural defect is Iran's over-dependence upon volatile oil revenues to support 
government spending - especially its system of state welfare and subsidies.143 While 
much of the world's economy was booming in the late 1990s, Iran's economy stalled 
because of the above factors, the most prominent of which was its over-reliance upon oil 
revenues that took a sharp decline in 1998/99.144 The Iranian government depends upon 
oil sales for almost half its revenue and 70 percent of the country's export earnings.145 
Because world oil-price fluctuations of as little as $1 per barrel (p/b) can increase or 
decrease Iranian revenues by over $1 billion, the central government has trouble 
balancing its budget when oil prices drop unexpectedly. This was the case in 1998/99, 
when the drop in oil prices reduced Iran's external account from a $2.2 billion surplus in 
1997/98, to a $2.1 billion deficit in 1998/99.146 Because of the price drop, Iran's budget 
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deficit increased from 2.5 percent to 6.7 percent of its GDP, despite self-imposed 
budgetary restraints.147 
The decline of oil prices in the mid and late '90s created several chronic 
socio-economic problems for Iran. After having achieved an average 7.2 percent growth 
in the first half of the decade, sliding oil prices cut Iran's annual growth nearly in half, to 
an average of 3.8 percent from March 1995 through March 2000.148 Low annual growth 
together with a booming population, which rose from 39 million to 62 million from 1980- 
1998 and is expected to reach 82 million by 2015, places a tremendous strain on Iran's 
struggling economy as it tries to create jobs for growing numbers of young Iranians.149 
With 720,000 to 850,000 workers entering the job market each year, Iran's 
unemployment soared to around 20 percent of the working population.150 Based upon his 
analysis, Amuzegar argues Iran needs to foster real economic growth of at least 6.7 
percent just to keep unemployment at 14 percent.151 
Iran additionally has experienced high inflation and suffers from a 
continued drop in per capita income because of its growing population. After oil prices 
dropped, the Iranian government bank-financed its deficit leading to an accelerated 
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monetary expansion and resultant inflation.152 Despite the rebound of oil prices in 
1999/2000 and the subsequent improvement in Iran's fiscal situation, Iran still suffers 
from inflation that remains anchored at around 18-20 percent.153 The population boom 
and oil price drop have also stripped Iran's GDP per capita, which has dropped 
precipitously since the revolution. The CIA estimates 53 percent of Iran's population 
lives below the poverty line.154 Today, compared with its oil-rich southern neighbors, 
Iran nearly ties with Iraq as the poorest country bordering the Persian Gulf.155 
Because of these economic troubles and imbalances, the "misery index" 
places continuous pressure upon the Iranian government to reform. Iranians demand the 
government lower inflation and unemployment and provide them with a generally better 
quality of life - such as that enjoyed in the West and by their southern Arab neighbors. 
Sensing the unrest and discontent, the regime in Iran has been trying for several years to 
undertake economic reforms to revive its failing economy. Despite a tremendous amount 
of rhetoric and some minor progress on those reforms, the Iranian government still failed 
to achieve the meaningful objectives it laid out in its last development plan (1994/95- 
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1999/00).156 Khatami not only faces a struggle between the conservatives and moderates 
on foreign policy, but also he confronts it in the economic arena. Owing to the various 
powers granted to the religious establishment within Iran's Islamic constitution, needed 
fiscal reforms are difficult to make. Reforms affecting the exchange rate, subsidies, price 
controls, privatization, or modifying the tax codes are not popular among groups reaping 
their dividends and wielding political and religious influence.157 
If the Iranian regime is to avoid unrest resulting from continued high 
levels of unemployment and inflation, it must find a path to reform and a means of 
stemming its gradual slide into economic ruin. Geoffrey Kemp summed up the problem 
in 1998, writing, "in order to develop its economy to meet the growing expectations of a 
large, young, and dissatisfied population, Iran must undertake massive capital investment 
in its energy sector."158 Yet, with its oil production maximized and few prospects of 
substantially increasing its output in the near (10 year) range, Iran must make reforms 
and work with Saudi Arabia on oil pricing until it can either boost production or overhaul 
its economy. Kemp concluded therefore, Iran must "work closely with both its energy 
rich and energy deficient neighbors to achieve mutually beneficial economic 
relationships."159 
b. Saudi Arabia 
Like Iran, Saudi Arabia also has several socio-economic obstacles to 
overcome. Having failed to yet diversify its economy, Saudi Arabia remains substantially 
dependent upon oil - much more than Iran's. As of 2000, Saudi Arabia draws 86 percent 
of its government revenue, 90 percent of its export revenue, and 40 percent of its GDP 
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from sales of petroleum products.160 Consequently, low oil prices directly affect the 
Saudi government's fiscal performance. Since government expenditures account for 
around 35 percent of the GDP, a substantial drop in revenue impacts virtually every other 
sector of the economy.161 The 1990's were a bad decade for the Saudis. Even before 
Saudi oil sunk to a low of $8.28 a barrel in November 1998, the Saudi economy was 
performing very poorly. In the five years leading up to the price drop (1993-1997), Saudi 
Arabia averaged only 0.9 percent annual growth.162 Even despite substantially higher oil 
prices during the last two years, Saudi Arabia still only managed to average 2.3 percent 
annually from 1991 to 2001.163 
Over-reliance upon oil and the nation's system of public welfare creates 
budgetary problems in Saudi Arabia. As a rentier state, the Saudi regime maintains a 
"social contract" with the Saudi people exchanging political representation and access to 
power for government subsidized lifestyles. As a result, Saudi Arabia suffers from 
several budgetary restrictions that create economic imbalances. These include: 
• a lack of tax revenue as a source of government income, thus forcing it to rely 
upon oil revenues instead; 
• a   large   public-sector   wage   bill   which   includes   job   creation   and 
defense security force spending; and 
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•    a requirement to dole out substantial government largesses including subsidies 
for housing, food, gas, medical care, education. 
These subsidies and wage bills amount to a substantial portion of the 
annual budget. Saudi Arabia's 2000 budget dedicated a total of $25 billion or 51 percent 
of the budget towards such areas and this did not include defense spending.164 Although 
these commitments cost the Saudi government substantial amounts, the government is 
afraid to reduce or eliminate them out of fear of widespread discontent. 
Consequently, the requirement to meet this "contract" and the 
government's heavy reliance upon fluctuating oil revenues creates planning problems, 
budget deficits, and government debt. Because of lower than expected oil revenues, 
mandatory "social contract" expenditures, and generally poor fiscal discipline, Saudi 
Arabia ran budget deficits averaging $7.6 billion dollars a year from 1995-1999.165 
Worse, until higher oil prices in 2000 buoyed up the Saudi economy, Saudi Arabia had 
not run a budget surplus since 1982. Budget deficits and the debt from the Gulf War 
substantially reduced Saudi financial reserves resulting in heavy domestic borrowing. 
Financing the budget deficits created a domestic debt equal to $162.7 billion or 101 
percent of the country's GDP and created a foreign debt exceeding $25 billion or 15.3 
percent of the GDP.166 These liabilities and their growing interest payments create a 
drain on government revenues that Saudi Arabia could invest back into the economy, 
infrastructure, and job creation. 
Because of these economic imbalances, Saudi Arabia suffers from several 
socio-economic problems. The combination of low economic growth and a growing 
population is creating a strain on the Saudi economy. Despite vast oil riches, Saudi 
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Arabia's population grows poorer and increasingly unemployed each year. An earlier 
population explosion during the oil boom of the 1980s and a birth rate averaging 3.2 
percent, creates an increasingly young population.167 As of 2000, 55 percent of the Saudi 
population was between 15 and 64 years old and 43 percent was under 14 years old.168 
As the so-called "oil boom baby boomers" enter the job market in increasing numbers, 
the Saudi economy must generate an estimated 100,000 jobs per year.169 According to 
Saudi-American Bank (SAMBA) chief economist Brad Bourland, the Saudi economy 
"simply has not been keeping pace with labor force growth over the past decade."170 Low 
economic growth has lead to growing unemployment, estimated officially at 14-15 
percent and unofficially at 27-35 percent of males and 95 percent of females.171 
Additionally, an excessive number of expatriates, totaling 5.3 million (25 percent) of the 
population, compete for jobs with Saudi nationals.172 The SAMBA 2000 report cites 
unemployment as the Saudi economy's most pressing challenge in the coming years.173 
The growing population not only creates employment problems, but also 
simultaneously creates a strain upon the government infrastructure and the average 
Saudi's per capita income. Since it peaked at $16,117 in 1981, per capita income in Saudi 
Arabia has dropped steadily.174 According to the IMF, Saudi per capita income in 2000 is 
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$8,254 - roughly half its 1981 level.175 Plunging per capita incomes reflect the larger 
deterioration of the "social contract." Growing numbers of Saudi seeking government 
sponsored lives are generating a tremendous demand for increased power, housing, food, 
gas, government jobs, education, and medical care. The Saudi government, limited in its 
ability to generate revenues by the above "contract" restrictions, must rely heavily upon 
higher oil prices to provide the spending money needed to invest in such services. As the 
population continues to grow to an estimated 33.7 million in 2015, the Saudi government 
will face increasing financial difficulties trying to provide jobs and subsidies for the 
citizenry. I76 
Accordingly, the Saudi regime knows it must make economic reforms if it 
is to avoid potentially destabilizing uprisings. Although these fiscal and socio-economic 
problems existed for several years, an effort began only in the late 90s to implement 
various reforms. Since the 1998 oil crash, Crown Prince Abdullah has undertaken to 
diversify the Saudi economy and encourage foreign investment as a means of boosting 
economic growth. Although these efforts have produced some results, they have not 
proceeded at the rate necessary to protect the economy from another oil price slump. 
According to one economist, 'Massive investment is needed, and it won't take much of a 
drop in oil prices to push Saudi Arabia back into the all-to-familiar territory of budget 
deficits.'177 
Just as the Saudi regime knows it must make economic reforms that will be 
destabilizing for its monarchial rule, Iran likewise knows it must make economic reforms 
to restart its economy. These reforms will be just as destabilizing as those in Saudi 
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Saudi Arabia and Iran can minimize these disruptions by boosting oil revenues. A few 
years ago, a Kuwaiti political analyst pointed out, "...sound oil policies are a principal 
way out [of financial trouble] for neighboring states and Iran over the short and medium- 
term."178 To do this, they need Iran's compliance in oil production quotas. The vehicle 
for doing this is OPEC. 
C.        VEHICLE FOR RAPPROCHEMENT: OPEC 
Despite their differences, Arabs and Iranians have one overarching common 
interest - oil. Oil serves as "a logical entry point to wider cooperation between Arabs and 
Iran" and since its founding OPEC has been the principle institution for achieving 
cooperation among Arabs and Iranians on oil issues.179 Today, Saudi Arabia and Iran are 
once again relying upon the organization to achieve cooperation in oil issues. In the short 
term, cooperation within OPEC to achieve stable, higher oil prices, and thus boost each 
nation's revenues, is the primary vehicle for the Saudi-Iranian detente. Limited and 
unsteady oil profits plague both regimes and force them to cooperate in shoring up this 
critical sector of their economies. 
Regardless of recent higher prices, the overall long-term trend for oil prices has 
been downward because of increased production worldwide, improvements in gas/oil 
efficiency, new technologies, and conservation. Therefore, Iran and Saudi Arabia have to 
diversify away from oil if they expect to create conditions fostering sustained growth in 
the future. Yet, ironically, in the short-term both nations require stable and moderate to 
high oil revenues to: 
• at least maintain their current per capita income levels; 
• reduce their annual budget deficits; 
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• make repairs and upgrades to their oil infrastructure; 
• pay down their foreign and domestic debt; 
• foster growth in non-oil sectors; 
• improve their general economic growth rates; and 
• create more jobs. 
More importantly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need higher oil revenues to help maintain their 
economic stability while they try to ease in needed economic reforms. For Khatami to 
implement the various measures in his proposed Third Development Plan (2000-2005), 
he will need the breathing room high oil revenues engineered through cooperation within 
OPEC can bring. According to Amuzegar, "A thriving and stable oil market would be 
essential for an effective implementation of these [reform] measures."180 To this same 
end, Saudi Arabia also needs to ensure oil supply and demand is closely coordinated with 
Iran within OPEC. "With oil revenues accounting for 75 percent of state income, no 
amount of skillful maneuvering by government strategists [to implement reforms] can 
engineer stable economic growth unless there is strong global demand for [Saudi oil]."181 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran concerning OPEC and oil policy were, 
however, just as turbulent as their diplomatic relations - often acting as an extension of 
them. While their ideological/political differences color their relations with regard to oil, 
an overarching reason for this friction within OPEC exists. Saudi Arabia and Iran look at 
oil production and pricing from different points of view. Saudi Arabia takes a long-term 
outlook to oil production and thus pricing. Large capital reserves, vast oil reserves, high 
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productive capacities, and small populations usually characterize long-term producers. 
Such countries' economies are not as sensitive to oil price fluctuations. These countries 
often ride out low prices by drawing upon the capital reserves they have built by having 
low overhead, such as small populations and or bureaucracies. Long-term producers, such 
as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, seek to keep production at relatively high levels and 
prices at low to moderate levels to shut out competition, gain larger market shares, and 
discourage conservation and substitution efforts. Saudi oil, some of the least expensive to 
produce, flooding the market drives out more expensive oils. As a result, Saudi oil can 
soak up larger shares of the market where these other oils might have had footholds. 
Furthermore, cheap oil precludes expensive research and exploration to find substitutes 
and stymies conservation efforts - making dependence upon Saudi oil much more acute. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia maintains concerns over the effects high oil prices have upon 
Western markets and their security relationship with the United States.182 
Iran, conversely, takes a short-term outlook to production, and pricing based on its 
needs and partly upon its ideology. Large populations and bureaucracies placing heavy 
everyday demands upon the government often characterize short-term countries. 
Additionally, extensive development projects, military build-ups, wars, and 
reconstruction projects consume these countries' oil revenues and deplete their savings or 
reserves. Although they may have extensive oil reserves, these countries also often lack 
oil production capacity. Iran is just such a case. A combination of Iran's debt from the 
eight-year fight with Iraq, general fiscal mismanagement, and the demands of its large 
population, forces Iran to seek higher revenues in the short term and makes their 
economy particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations. Additionally, Iran's revolutionary 
ideology used to color its outlook on oil pricing. Revolutionary Iran viewed oil as the 
Muslim peoples' "birthright," not as a weapon against other Muslims or for a particular 
group's interests.183 As a result, Iran, relatively unconcerned with the long-term impact 
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of higher prices, sought to keep production low and revenues high to provide their people 
with subsidized lifestyles. 
These factors and opposing viewpoints on oil production, combined with 
production disparities and misperceptions of each other's intentions, contributed in the 
past to poor Saudi-Iranian relations. Saudi oil analyst Nawaf Obaid summed up oil's role 
in Saudi interstate relations, writing "whereas many elements - economic, historical, 
religious, and political - make up the kingdom's relations with oil exporters, those 
relations are heavily conditioned by one key set of facts: the kingdom possesses the 
largest petroleum reserves, greatest spare capacity, and the cheapest uplift costs in the 
world."184 Much of the problem between the two revolved around Saudi Arabia's 
superior production capacity. Saudi Arabia, during most of her relations with Iran, has 
been the largest producer within OPEC. Saudi Arabia has the capacity to produce 10 
million barrels per day (mb/d), while Iran barely 3.7 mb/d.185 Exacerbating the gap, 
Saudi Arabia's OPEC production quota averages around 8 mb/d - leaving it a surge or 
"swing" production capacity of 2 mb/d.186 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's high quota 
corresponds to a small population (21 million), while Iran's quota of is dwarfed by its 
population (65 million). Accordingly, Iran was often both jealous and threatened by the 
Saudi ability to open up production to flood the market and single-handedly drive prices 
down. During the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran saw high levels of Saudi oil production as a 
form of economic warfare. Iran perceived Saudi attempts to keep oil prices low as a 
scheme to defeat their revolution by "selling out" their fellow Muslims.187 Chubin sums 
up Iran's perceptions asserting, "Iran with large revenue needs, little sympathy for the 
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West, insufficient reserves to take a long term view of the market, and production at 
maximum capacity, saw Saudi oil policy as an extension of its alliance with the United 
States."188 Iran asserted Saudi Arabia should act as the "swing producer" - adjusting its 
production up or down as a sort of market "savoir" - protecting stable prices. 
Saudi Arabia, however, felt Iran's selfish short-term concerns could not hold back 
their production and profits.189 Saudi Arabia did not feel the responsibility to shoulder 
most of the cuts so Iran could continue to maximize its own production and revenues. 
Saudi Arabia maintained its production floor of 8 mb/d - 35 percent of OPEC's output. 
Since Saudi Arabia wielded the most power within OPEC, Iran was relatively powerless 
to impact OPEC decisions except through political pressure and veiled military threats. 
Although both Saudi Arabia and Iran were able to come to the table over oil issues 
several times in the past, these agreements seldom lasted very long because of the 
nations' differences in market outlook and political perception. As a result, production 
agreements meant to buoy flagging oil prices often collapsed over cross-accusations of 
cheating on quotas. 
The deteriorating condition of their economies because of both demographic 
pressures and the collapse of oil prices in 1993 and 1998, however, forced changes in 
Saudi-Iranian relations. In 1993, Saudi Arabia faced not only slumping oil prices and 
their effect on its economy, but the Saudi regime also faced increased Sunni and Shi'ite 
dissident activity, an always-contentious hajj season, and negotiations between the GCC 
and Iran over Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands. Similarly, Iran was facing economic 
troubles of its own as a result low oil prices and the previously mentioned socio- 
economic pressures. An agreement brokered between the two nations to shore up slipping 
oil prices, boosted Iran's quota from 3.3 to 3.6 mb/d at Saudi expense. Allegedly, Saudi 
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Arabia saw this cooperation over oil as an offering to improve relations with Iran.190 
Cooperation, in the Saudi view, would boost oil prices, possibly lessen Iranian 
sponsorship of Saudi dissident activity, lessen hajj tensions.191 The Saudis even held out 
the hope warmer relations with Iran might benefit negotiations over the disputed islands 
by creating a better diplomatic environment.192 The political climate, however, had not 
changed sufficiently in Iran, nor had the economic situations in both countries grown dire 
enough to hold the accord together. Despite the agreement, heralded as the beginning of 
an era of good relations, the two sides soon were back at one another's throats with 
accusations of over-production, untrustworthiness, and giving in to US pressure.193 It 
would take a change in the political climates and the continued deterioration of their 
economies, compounded by yet another collapse in oil prices, to secure a lasting 
agreement. 
The 1998 price slide produced a genuine change in Saudi-Iranian relations. In 
keeping with their strategy of engineering low oil prices to discourage competition and 
expand their market share, Saudi Arabia sought and achieved a 10 percent production 
increase within OPEC in November of 1997. The strategy, however, backfired. A warm 
winter in North America combined with the injection of Iraqi "food-for-oil" stocks into 
the market and the collapse of the Asian economy to create a glut of oil that ultimately 
dropped oil prices far below OPEC's comfort level. While the low prices severely cut 
competition, especially in the Caspian region, the price dropped low enough to cut Saudi 
oil revenues by $14 billion (30 percent) and force the country into its first recession since 
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the 1993 price collapse.194 The drop in oil revenues also hurt other OPEC members like 
Iran, who could not afford to ride out the lull by tapping reserves.195 As in 1993, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran bickered for a year over who would take the largest percentage 
production cut to bring prices back to acceptable levels. Finally, in early 1999, the sheer 
economic pressure forced the two sides to make concessions to salvage their troubled 
economies. Saudi oil analyst Nawaf Obaid argues, "the motive behind the production cuts 
was clear - one of the weakest oil markets in years placed severe pressure on all 
exporters, especially Saudi Arabia." 196 Amazing many analysts, the Saudis led the way 
taking the lion's share of the production cuts (585,000 b/d), dipping substantially below 
their 8 mb/d floor to 7.44 mb/d.197 As a sign of newfound solidarity, the Iranians 
followed the Saudi lead and took the second largest production cut (264,000 b/d).198 The 
combined cuts by OPEC and non-OPEC exporters totaling 2.1 mb/d immediately drove 
prices up and substantially contributed to oil prices reaching their highest levels in over a 
decade - over $35 per barrel by September of 2000.199 Since then, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have maintained a united front within OPEC - jointly advancing production cuts and 
increases - to keep prices within a set price band. Additionally, continued quota 
discipline, previously uncharacteristic of OPEC members during good times, has helped 
to maintain stable prices.200 Owing to OPEC's newly discovered solidarity, oil prices are 
remaining high and providing much needed revenue for OPEC member's struggling 
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economies. Saudi Arabia and Iran are readjusting their development plans to account for 
the increase in foreign export earnings resulting from substantially higher oil prices. 
Chapter Four covers these implications in more detail. 
Although Saudi-Iranian relations were improving, the March 1999 production cut 
agreement put negotiations into high gear. The exchange of diplomatic visits at the 
highest levels and rapidly expanding economic and security ties marked the remainder of 
1999. In May, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan visited Tehran to discuss closer 
relations.201 Later that same month, President Khatami met with King Fadh and Crown 
Prince Abdullah in Riyadh. (See Figure 5.) This was the first such meeting between the 
countries' leaders in over twenty years, opening new doors in their rapprochement.202 
Khatami also met with other major Saudi ministers and toured the country, making a 
remarkable stop in Saudi Arabia's predominately Shfah eastern provinces. At that same 
time, Saudi Arabia contributed to better relations by announcing the appointment of a 
Shi'ah, Jameel al-Jishi, as Saudi ambassador to Tehran.203 Continued OPEC solidarity 
and higher prices saw Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri visit Saudi 
Arabia in October 1999. During his visit, the two countries agreed to continue improving 
relations and to coordinate an Islamic response to regional and world affairs.204 The next 
month Saudi Arabia held a trade fair in Tehran - the first in Iran since the 1979 Islamic 
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revolution. The fair expanded the political-economic relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.205 
Figure 5. Khatami and Abdullah Meet in Riyadh, May 17,1999.206 
Continued solidarity in OPEC and resulting high oil prices maintained both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran's efforts at rapprochement in 2000. Leading off these effort in the new 
millennium was King Fadh's invitation to Ayatollah Khamenei to visit Saudi Arabia for 
the hajj - the first such overture since 1979.207 Despite GCC reservations over improving 
relations with Iran, relations continued to improve between Saudi Arabia and Iran.208 
Even Secretary of Defense Cohen's April visit to Saudi Arabia, where he warned them of 
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Iran's continued threat, could not slow their growing cooperation.209 In fact, the 
remainder of 2000 saw a continued exchange of high-level diplomatic visits surrounding 
efforts to conclude a Saudi-Iranian security agreement.210 2000 ended with the highest oil 
prices in a decade, predictions of large revenue surpluses, and speeches lauding Saudi- 
Iranian relations by both Khatami and Abdullah before the world stage of the U.N.'s 
Millennium Conference.21' Relations between the two nations were stronger than ever. 
At the time of this paper, Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to benefit from high oil 
prices because of their cooperation within OPEC. Boasting large oil revenue surpluses, 
improved economic growth, and a doubling in bilateral trade, both nations remain active 
in promoting their relations outside OPEC.212 Most notably in April 2001, after another 
uneventful hajj season, Saudi Arabia and Iran finally signed their unprecedented and 
"long-awaited" security agreement.213 Although this agreement does not involve matters 
related to national defense or extradition of criminals, it marks the pinnacle of Saudi- 
Iranian cooperation to date - to include the period before the revolution.214 The 
implications of this unprecedented level of cooperation impacts oil prices, but it also has 
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large implications for the domestic stability of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the stability of the 
region, and US policies therein. These implications are the subject of the next chapter. 
D.        SUMMARY 
Despite a history of poor relations, Saudi Arabia and Iran are seeking common 
ground for improved relations in numerous areas. This cooperation is the result of several 
contributing and or driving factors such as: 
the   election   of   moderate   president   Khatami's   and   the   subsequent 
consolidation of and elite consensus over foreign and oil policies; 
the increased power of Crown Prince Abdullah and his focus upon regional 
issues and reforming the economy; 
the failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy to remove Saddam Hussein 
or collapse/change Iran's revolutionary regime; 
the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords and the perceived failure of the 
United States to pressure Israel into settling the matter; 
Although the above political enablers support the detente, the severe economic decline 
and its repercussions upon the domestic political stability of both Iran and Saudi Arabia is 
the critical force in their rapprochement. Major economic problems such as exceptionally 
high unemployment, poor economic growth, growing foreign and domestic debt, annual 
budget deficits, and an economy overly dependent upon petroleum production, have 
demanded a change in the way Saudi Arabia and Iran approach matters of state. 
Pragmatic economic policies designed to maximize oil revenues and salvage both 
nations' deteriorating economies are the basis of the Saudi-Iranian detente and are 
accelerating its growth. The implications of this detente are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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IV.    IMPLICATIONS 
A.        IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES 
In a March 2000 speech designed to improve dialogue between the United States 
and Islamic Republic of Iran, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright emphasized the 
important role Iran plays in the Persian Gulf region: 
There is no question that Iran's future direction will play a pivotal role in 
the economic and security affairs of what much of the world reasonably 
considers the center of the world.... The United States recognizes Iran's 
importance in the Gulf.... We look toward Iran truly fulfilling its promises 
to serve as an 'anchor of stability'....215 
Her comments were not an exaggeration of Iran's significance in the region. Iran's ability 
to act as a US proxy - blocking Soviet expansion - was critical to the US "Twin Pillars" 
policy up until the revolution. Today, Iran straddles the Straits of Hormuz and the 
Caspian region, providing it continued influence, if not outright control, over both the 
Persian Gulf and Caspian regions' energy exports. Iran itself is the fifth largest oil 
producer in the world and the second largest within OPEC. Additionally, Iran has the 
second largest reserves of natural gas in the world next to Russia. Iran's Islamic 
revolution in 1979 shook not only the regional sheikdoms to their core, but also radically 
altered the course of US relations throughout the Muslim world. Iran's eight-year war 
with Iraq polarized the Gulf and drew the United States into the fray. Today, Iran's 
"peace offensive" has nearly reversed the US policy of "containment" by enlisting the 
support and recognition of such world powers as China, Russia, Japan, and Germany. In 
short, Iran's actions and influence, especially within the Persian Gulf, have implications 
extending well outside the region. 
215
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Saudi Arabia holds no less a position in its ability to affect world and regional 
affairs. Saudi Arabia, as the largest producer of oil in the world, can directly drive the 
price of oil up or down. Additionally, not only does Saudi Arabia control one-fourth of 
the worlds proven oil reserves, but also it holds sway over the affairs of its fellow 
members in the GCC, who combined control more than half the world's proven oil 
reserves. As a result, the kingdom's influence within the world oil market is nearly 
supreme. Since the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia has come to be the United States' 
foremost ally in the region. In this role, it provided the funds and served as the launching 
pad for the US-led Operation Desert Shield/Storm that ejected Saddam Hussein out of 
Kuwait in 1991. Saudi Arabia also sponsors several thousand US troops and their 
equipment in continuing operations against Iraq. The kingdom is also the birth place of 
the Islam and therefore holds tremendous sway over the Muslims of the world, who all 
must make a pilgrimage there at least once in their lifetime. Saudi Arabia's actions, like 
those of Iran, have major repercussions, especially within the region and within the oil 
markets of the world. 
The Saudi-Iranian detente has special significance for the United States because it 
combines the unique influences of each actor, creating powerful implications for the 
United States. Iran and Saudi Arabia's on-going rapprochement holds especially 
important implications for US interests in three vital areas. First, the Saudi-Iranian 
detente has overarching effects upon the dynamics of the global oil market, potentially 
influencing the world's economy in a detrimental way. Second, the rapprochement 
between Riyadh and Tehran holds beneficial influences for each nation's domestic 
stability. This stability is vital to the stability of the region. The Saudi-Iranian detente also 
directly affects regional security by bringing Iran meaningfully back into the politics of 
the Gulf. This, in turn, affects inter-Gulf relations and prospects for both establishing a 
regional security framework and continuing the US military presence in the region. 
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B.        OIL 
1.        Oil and OPEC's Rebound 
Saudi-Iranian relations have had a tremendous affect upon the global oil market, 
which in itself directly affects the heavily energy dependent economies of industrialized 
nations such as the United States. Specifically, the Saudi-Iranian detente has restored not 
only OPEC's cohesion and influence, but it has fostered oil prices at levels many 
consider harmful to the US and world economies. This has in turn led to increased 
tension between the United States and Saudi Arabia, its key ally within OPEC. 
In early 1999, despite OPEC attempts to stem their collapse, oil prices plunged to 
their lowest point since 1986; leading some to speculate as to OPEC's future 
relevance.216 Routine cheating on quotas by several members (notably Iran and Nigeria) 
made production agreements worthless.217 Despite this, in March 1999, Saudi Arabia, 
with the backing of Iran, orchestrated an agreement that subsequently produced a two- 
year bullish oil market, restoring OPEC's international clout.218 Due in large part to the 
Saudi-Iranian agreement and ensuing OPEC unity, OPEC's "basket" oil price rebounded 
sharply, doubling and at times even tripling in value during 2000.219 Beginning with the 
March 1999 agreement, OPEC production cuts rallied prices from less than $10 per barrel 
(p/b) in December 1998, to a peak of over $30 p/b in August 2000; an overall average of 
more than $27 p/b for 2000.220 (See Figure 6.) 
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Figure 6. Monthly OPEC Basket Price, 1997-2001.221 
In spite of some occasional Saudi-Iranian dissention over production increases 
and the selection of a new secretary-general, OPEC not only remained unified throughout 
2000, but also managed to keep prices at the high end of the market ($25-$30). The lack 
of dissention and high prices were even more remarkable given the intense US and 
international pressure placed upon OPEC members to change their production policies. 
Much of the US pressure falls upon Saudi Arabia for four reasons: 
• it has the productive capacity to make substantial market corrections; 
• it is the recognized leader within OPEC; 
221
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• as an ally, the United States has a working relationship with Saudi Arabia; and 
• many still hold Saudi Arabia owes the United States a debt of gratitude after 
the Gulf War. 
From March 1999 through March 2001, OPEC remained firm in its decision to 
raise and maintain oil prices within a so-called "price band" ranging from $22 to $28 p/b. 
After the March 1999 cuts, oil prices rose steadily. This did not draw much attention 
from the United States, which initially assumed market forces would eventually readjust 
prices downward.222 Yet, demand for increased OPEC production began to mount from 
several fronts once oil topped $25 p/b and US gasoline and heating oil prices soared in 
February 2000. Pressures on OPEC during the next year ranged from the Clinton 
administration's "quiet...engaged diplomacy" to Congressional strong-arm tactics that 
even included the introduction of legislation intended to deal with the "oil price-fixing 
activities, policies, and programs of OPEC."223 Congressional charges that the Clinton 
administration lacked a comprehensive energy policy led to partisan calls for the 
resignation of Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and became the mantra of 
Republican political candidates in the hard fought 2000 campaign for the White 
House.224 This placed even more.demands upon the administration to get OPEC 
production increases. For the next several months, Energy Secretary Richardson traveled 
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the globe from Saudi Arabia to Mexico successfully lobbying for a series of production 
increases. Yet, despite a chain of Saudi-led production hikes in March (1.7 million b/d), 
June (708,000 b/d), and July (500,000 b/d), prices only dropped temporarily before 
continuing to spiral upwards of $30 p/b. In September, prices peaked near $35 p/b, 
drawing massive public protests in Europe, severe outcry in the United States, and dire 
warnings of an oil-induced global slowdown.225 Once again, growing pressure on OPEC 
and their own worries over the affect of extraordinarily high prices on world markets, led 
them to boost production by 800,000 b/d starting on October 1. Market speculation, 
alleged shortfalls in refinery capabilities, and the outbreak of unrest in Palestine, kept 
prices, however, firmly above the $28 p/b mark. 
Throughout September and into the winter, fuel prices soared worldwide fostering 
more predictions of a global recession. Forecasts of heating oil shortages in the coming 
winter and its impact upon the closing days of the 2000 presidential elections, forced 
President Clinton to order the controversial release of thirty million barrels of oil from the 
US Strategic Petroleum Reserves.226 Despite Clinton and Richardson's continuous 
lobbying efforts, OPEC declined to make further production changes citing growing 
worries of oversupply.227 A December price drop of several dollars per barrel 
exacerbated these worries.228 In 2001, worries over another potential price collapse saw 
OPEC disregard continued US calls for production hikes and instead make two 
substantial production cuts in January (1.5 million b/d) and March (1 million b/d). These 
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cuts demonstrated the seriousness of OPEC's intention to proactively defend higher 
prices in 2001.229 OPEC actions to stem the decline may not succeed in 2001. Most 
analysts predict average oil prices will be slightly lower than in 2000, but would remain 
above the $22 benchmark throughout 2001.230 Given the forecasts hold, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia should see oil revenues decrease slightly, but remain well above the lows of the 
late 90s.231 Should prices continue to rise, however, pressure upon Saudi Arabia will 
increase substantially since they are one of the few countries that still have spare 
production capacity. In February, OPEC was pumping at near 95 percent of its nominal 
capacity - leaving only Saudi Arabia (1.5-2.0 mb/d), United Arab Emirates (500,000 
b/d), and Kuwait (280,000 b/d) with remaining capacity to meet demand.232 
2. Potential Damage to World Economy 
OPEC's cohesion and apparent ability to "micro-manage" the highly volatile oil 
market to raise and maintain prices has surprised many analysts. The higher prices Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are trying to achieve, in the end, however, may hurt both the world 
economy and the oil market itself. As mentioned in Chapter III, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
have traditionally disagreed over oil production, virtually dividing OPEC into two 
production camps. The growing strength of the current detente, built upon Saudi-Iranian 
oil dealings, has breeched the divide and brought increased consensus and cohesion 
throughout OPEC. As a result, OPEC has not only been able to maintain prices within its 
set band for over a year, but also achieved levels above the $28 mark for eighty-one 
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consecutive trading days in 2000.233 (See Figure 7.) This ability to manage prices at the 
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Figure 7. OPEC Basket Prices and the Price Band.234 
increase in the price of oil, there is a corresponding increase in revenues of several billion 
dollars for each major producer. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran need the higher revenues to 
meet their budgeted expenses and could use the surplus to help their struggling 
economies in other areas. Saudi Arabia, for example, is only funding a six percent 
increase in spending in 2001. Such a small percentage does not provide much of an 
economic stimulus to the economy. Unless oil revenues substantially exceed projections, 
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investment to stimulate the economy.235 Iran also needs the higher revenues to fund an 
overall nominal annual budgetary increase of 25 percent, including a 22 percent increase 
in defense spending and 40 percent for more police.236 
To this end, Saudi Arabia and Iran are trying to manage prices at the high end of 
the spectrum without necessary regard for the detrimental effects it can have upon the 
market in the long-term.237 This tendency could impact the global economy and stress 
US-Saudi relations. Merrill Lynch forecasts oil prices for 2001 will be above the 10-year 
historical average because of "secular growth in the demand for OPEC crude and, more 
importantly, the desire by key OPEC countries, notably Saudi Arabia, to administer a 
higher price band."238 The West worries that because of the industrialized world's high 
oil demands, higher prices will hurt economic growth in the coming year. Since $17 p/b 
figures underpinned the booming economy of the 1990s, analysts figure higher prices 
will cause a contraction in growth.239 Economists with Credit Suisse and the IMF predict 
for every $5 p/b rise in cost, global economic growth slows by a quarter (0.25) of a 
percent.240 Since 199S. oil prices rose approximately $10 p/b, which equates to a .5 
percentage point drop in world growth. In March 2001, the United States, which 
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consumes over 20 mb/d (45 percent from OPEC), reported higher energy costs were 
having a negative effect upon the nation's economy.241 
Despite protest over the spiraling costs of energy, OPEC maintained its defiance, 
cutting production twice for a total of 2.5 mb/d in the first quarter of 2001. In a 
particularly telling exchange, Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi dismissed concerns that 
cuts would hurt the economy and confirmed the Saudi desire to defend prices at $25 p/b, 
keeping the band "very narrow." He then continued to openly threaten non-OPEC 
producers saying: 
We hope that all major producers will see the light and cooperate [with 
production cuts]. The alternative is really not very healthy, neither for the 
companies, for the governments, whether they are producers or 
consumers. We have seen disaster more than once when all of us vie for 
market share. I have no doubt that they will cooperate and they will 
deliver. Everybody wants $25, even non-OPEC, so why should our share 
be less? Everybody knows that if OPEC wants to slug it out, we will be 
very successful in the long run. But in the short run everybody will be 
destroyed. They know that.242 
The exchange was indicative of the new Saudi policy to defend high prices and 
revenues rather aggressively. This will put it increasingly at odds with US demands for 
energy at affordable rates. The new Bush administration is, however, less forceful in its 
rhetoric than it was during the 2000 campaign. While campaigning, Bush reportedly 
argued President Clinton needed to simply get on the phone with OPEC and tell them, 
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"We expect you to open your spigots!"243 Nevertheless, since his election, President 
Bush has taken a different tack, employing a policy that "focuses on the long term" and 
realizes higher prices are a "supply-and-demand issue."244 It is unlikely Bush, a former 
Texas oilman, was ignorant of the nature of supply and demand during the election, 
rather it reflects some naivety on foreign relations and the dynamics of US-OPEC 
relations. Whether the United States will clash further with OPEC in the future depends 
how deeply it slides into recession and whether high oil prices, linked to the Saudi- 
Iranian detente, are deemed the main cause. 
C.        DOMESTIC STABILITY 
The United States has a historical interest in the free flow of Persian Gulf oil to 
the industrialized world and in preventing hostile powers from interrupting that flow.245 
Regional stability, in the context of those overarching objectives, is vital to their 
maintenance.246 The achievement of regional stability, nevertheless, is inextricably tied 
to the domestic stability of both Iran and Saudi Arabia.247 As it did during the 1979 
Iranian revolution, radical changes or revolutions in the domestic affairs of either state 
have the potential to destabilize the region.248 The Saudi-Iranian agreement has been 
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especially helpful in stemming the tide of social discontent in both nations. It provides 
them increased revenue and legitimacy in the short-term, so they may try long-term 
reforms. Domestic stability, in turn, is the foundation for future cooperation between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran and it is essential for maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf 
region. 
1. Iran 
The Saudi-Iranian detente has improved Iran's domestic stability, at least in the 
short-term. The substantial increase in revenues helps reinforce the Islamic regime's 
legitimacy and stabilized its economy while the regime pursues needed reforms. The 
collapse of oil prices in 1998-1999 hit Iran's struggling economy especially hard. 
Unemployment ran as high as 25 percent, inflation crested over 20 percent, and the 
country's growth rate dropped from 3.7 in 1997/98 to 1.8 percent in 1998/99.249 Iran also 
faced extensive external debt, high state subsidies, a large and inefficient state sector, 
independent religion-based state monopolies {bonyads), a severe 30-year record 
agricultural drought, and international isolation and sanctions weighing on its thinly 
stretched oil resources. This poor economic performance coupled with a young, rapidly 
expanding, educated, and urbanized population has been at the heart of increasing crime, 
drug use, and widespread social discontent. The recent oil boom is, therefore, a blessing 
to the Khatami regime, which took over on the eve of the oil collapse in late 1997. Since 
then, oil export revenues jumped 121 percent, reaching an estimated $23.6 billion in 
2000.250 The surge in revenues generated an oil revenue surplus of between $9 and $10 
billion.251 This injection of revenue more than doubled Iran's GDP, from 2.5 percent in 
1980s, which then also led to the 1990 Gulf War, which in turn fostered increased dissention in Saudi 
Arabia in the early to mid-1990s. 
249
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1999/00 to 5.2 percent in 2000/01. Since oil revenues account for roughly 40-50 percent 
of the government's budget, the unexpected jump also helped stabilize their budgetary 
troubles for the time being. (See Table 1.) 
Performance Indicator 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal GDP (percent) 18 27       j 30 
Real GDP (percent) 1.8 2.5 5.2 
Per Capita GDP (US$) 3,030 3,800 NA 
Average Iranian Oil Price 
(US$/barrel) 
NA 17.20 24.00 
Table 1. Iran's Economic Performance (1998-2000) 252 
As in Saudi Arabia, the jump in revenues has helped to stabilize the government 
by taking some pressure off the Khatami regime, which needs every advantage it can get 
in its reform struggle with the conservative factions. Additionally, the windfall profits 
come during a presidential election year in which Khatami seeks to reaffirm his popular 
mandate for continued reforms. The increase in revenues provided a much more 
optimistic outlook among government officials. Iran's Central Bank Governor beamed in 
October 2000, "higher oil prices will really help us speed up investment, reduce 
unemployment, and accelerate our economic growth."253 The cash infusion could not 
come soon enough as one member of the Majlis commented, "unemployment has reached 
a  critical  state  and  the  situation  is  near  explosion."254  In  an  attempt  to  stem 
251 "IRNA commentary views role of oil in economic growth," IRNA, 8 April 2001, in FBIS, 
IAP20010408000060, 8 April 2001; and Hugh Pope, "Petrodollars Staying Under Mattresses - Chastened 
OPEC Nations Use Windfall to Ease Fiscal, Economic Woes," Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2000,. 
A16. 
252 Sources: IMF, "World Economic Outlook: Fiscal and Macroeconomic Stability," data for 
nominal GDP growth; and Political Risk Services Group, Iran Country Report, estimates for real GDP 
percentage change, per capita income and oil prices. 
253 "Oil Windfall Shifts Iran Economy into Growth Mode," Business Recorder, 10 October 2000. 
Available [On-line]: <http://www.brecorder.com/story/S00DD/SDJ01/SDJ01167.htm> [27 March 2001]. 
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unemployment and immediately jump-start the economy while the boom lasts, Khatami's 
government eagerly tapped into the growing surplus in mid-year. In August 2000, 
Khatami sought the Majlis' permission to release surplus funds from Iran's newly 
established "special oil stabilization fund" - a reserve set aside under the latest Five Year 
Plan (2000-2005) to protect Iran's economy from oil price shocks.255 The Majlis agreed 
to release half the funds for investment in development projects and loans to the private 
sector as part of the government's overall plan to stimulate growth, reduce 
unemployment, and diversify away from oil dependence. If the economic stimulus 
package is successful and oil revenues remain high, then the prospects for Khatami's re- 
election look even brighter. While critics contend the large infusion of capital into the 
Iranian economy may create even higher inflation rates, Khatami remains optimistic. 
"The public's greater trust in [my] administration and the Islamic Republic's improved 
international standing has created unique opportunities to realize economic goals," 
Khatami remarked to the Majlis in presenting his 2001 budget.256 He continued, "Thanks 
to public support and participation, we are getting through myriads of political, 
economic, and social problems."257 
2. Saudi 
The Saudi-Iranian detente has also helped stabilize the Saudi regime. The 
improvement in relations with Iran improved the al-Saud regime's legitimacy and 
stabilized its economy in the short-term, providing it maneuver room to enact needed 
reforms over the long-term. While increased revenues helped take the financial stress off 
Saudi Arabia, Riyadh's closeness to Iran improved the regime's ability to refute 
accusations of being a US puppet. This improved the al-Saud regime's legitimacy with its 
subjects and other Arab nations. Additionally, improved relations removed Iranian 
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support for opposition forces within Saudi Arabia, helping the regime to further stabilize 
its domestic situation. 
In a RAND study of political violence and its affects on the stability of Gulf 
nations, authors Daniel Byman and Jerrold Green conclude, "demographic and economic 
problems are at the root of many grievances Gulf citizens express about their 
regimes."258 The collapse of oil prices in 1998-1999 exacerbated these same tensions 
within Saudi Arabia and was a driving force in its decision to work with Iran to achieve 
higher oil prices. The success of the Saudi-Iranian led price rally produced windfall 
profits for the Saudi regime. Because of the continued boom, Saudi oil export revenues 
jumped sharply from $40 billion in 1999 to $77 billion in 2000.259 Since oil revenues 
accounted for roughly 86 percent of the Saudi government's 2000 budget, the unexpected 
jump directly translated into a budget surplus of $12 billion dollars.260 This has translated 
into a vast improvement in Saudi Arabia's economic performance and outlook. (See 
Table 2.) 
Performance Indicator 
Nominal GDP (percent) 
Real GDP (percent) 
Per Capita GDP (US$) 

















Table 2. Saudi Arabia's Economic Performance (1998-2000) 261 
258 Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, Political Violence and Stability in the States of the 
Northern Persian Gulf (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999), xiv. 
259
 SAMBA, 4. 
260
 Ibid 6. Actual Saudi oil prices in 2000 outpaced government expectations by $9 per barrel 
($27 per barrel vice the $18 planning figure) 6. 
261
 Sources: SAMBA and U.S. Embassy, Saudi Arabia: 2000 Economic Trends (Riyadh: U.S. 
Embassy, April 2000) Available [On-line]: <http://usembassy.state.gov/riyadh/wwwhet00.html> [24 March 
2001]. 
79 
In the short-term, the jump in revenues stabilizes Saudi Arabia by taking some 
pressure off the government, which ran budget deficits for the last seventeen years.262 
According to the Saudi American Bank, however, the higher oil revenues "did not 
translate into a broad-based economic boom, as the government used the income to 
improve its fiscal health, rather than spend."263 While the budget allowed the government 
to immediately pay $2.1 billion in cash obligation to government workers, $2.6 billion in 
debts to farmers and contractors, and reinstate barley subsidies it suspended in 1998, the 
government notably did not go on a spending spree like in the past.264 This was the case 
throughout much of OPEC as "chastened" members recalled the 1999 price collapse and 
decided to keep the petrodollars "under their mattresses," focusing instead on mending 
their external fiscal situations.265 The Wall Street Journal and SAMBA estimated much 
of the additional funds were put aside as a hedge fund to counter oil downturns and or 
invested in foreign, particularly US, assets.266 
Although higher oil prices bode well for Saudi short-term stability, prospects for 
the Saudi use of the windfall profits to enact long-term reforms are mixed. Despite the 
rise in oil revenues, Saudi Arabia still faces serious fiscal challenges including an over- 
dependence upon oil revenues, high government debt, low capital expenditures because 
of excessive state salaries and interests payments, high unemployment, and declining per 
capita income. Solving these fundamental fiscal imbalances will require substantial 
reform. Saudi Arabia's latest Five-Year (2000-2005) plan is off to a good start and 
promises fiscal restraint in keeping with the government's needs to restore its fiscal 
262
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health while implementing reforms to diversify the economy away from oil.267 The 2001 
budget calls for balance with a slight (6 percent) increase focused on addressing the needs 
of Saudi Arabia's growing population, such as hospitals and desalinization plants, instead 
of more defense items.268 Indeed, if Saudi-Iranian relations help reduce regional security 
tensions, then perhaps the Saudi government could substantially reduce defense spending, 
which accounted for roughly 12 percent of its annual GDP in 1997.269 In any case, Saudi 
Arabia is focusing on implementing several reforms including: 
• drafting new tax laws; 
• accelerating privatization of government assets; 
• improving and strengthening customs and tax administration; 
• implementing civil service reform; and 
• passing legislation encouraging foreign direct investment, especially in 
infrastructure such as electricity and telecommunications.270 
Despite the improved short-term fiscal situation and indications that Saudi Arabia 
is becoming more fiscally responsible, there still is legitimate concern that the increase in 
revenues might lead them to forestall forging ahead with reforms they know will 
ultimately hurt.271 The Saudi government knows especially well that reforming the 
267 SAMBA, 8. 
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country's economy will anger more Saudis than it will please.272 Therefore, the appeal of 
a short-term solution may again lure the Saudi government to rely on high oil prices to 
bail them out. In Joshua Teitelbaum's study of Saudi Arabia's Islamic opposition, he 
warns of just such a tendency among Saudi leadership: "At times, it seems as if the 
Saudis put their faith in windfall profits from a rise in oil prices. Indeed, a subsequent rise 
in oil prices in 2000 did not bring about any radical changes in Saudi economic 
policy."273 The Energy Information Administration (EIA) finds similar tendencies and 
reports Saudi reform efforts, such as reducing subsidies, are "sporadic at best."274 For 
example, Saudi Arabia announced an electricity rate increase in April 2000, but had to 
repeal it in the face of widespread protest just seven months later.275 Overall, in EIA's 
assessment, "higher oil revenues [in Saudi Arabia and throughout OPEC] tend to reduce 
pressures towards painful reforms."276 
Saudi Arabia's accord with Iran also contributes to Saudi regime legitimacy and 
domestic stability in three perhaps less tangible ways. First, by moving its relations 
towards Iran, Saudi Arabia distances itself from allegations of subservience to the United 
States and its support for the "Zionists" - Israel. Many average Saudi citizens harbor an 
exaggerated perception that the United States controls the region and their 
government.277 Saudis resent not only this perceived influence, but also the overt 
presence of US forces on Islam's holy soil, the spread of Western culture, and the United 
States' close ties to Israel. Saudis, as well as other Arabs and Iranians, also readily point 
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to the heavy lobbying of Saudi leaders by senior US officials as a sure sign of excessive 
US influence.278 Trips to Riyadh by the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy on 
such topics as increased arms purchases, Iraqi sanctions, and lower oil prices are a yearly, 
if not more often occurrence. Saudi citizens' suspicions of the regime's subservience to 
Washington are often confirmed when such lobbying produces decisions that coincide 
with US interests - such as new arms contracts, operations versus Iraq, or hikes in oil 
production.279 On the other hand, taking positions that run counter to US interests, most 
notably in opposition to the Arab-Israeli Peace Accords, enhances the Saudi regime's 
legitimacy. Along these lines, no move could better demonstrate Saudi independence 
from US control than to ally with the most fervently anti-US power in the region. In 
short, Saudi relations with Iran help demonstrate the kingdom is independent of US 
control. Because of Iran's long-running condemnation of the United States, Saudi-Iranian 
relations are difficult to twist into anything other than a clear rejection of Washington's 
policies.280 This bolsters Crown Prince Abdullah's credibility with the average Saudi 
citizen and with the more extremist elements that might otherwise launch potentially 
destabilizing bombing attacks within the kingdom. The rejection of the United States is 
also a very popular current motif throughout the Middle East given the on-going unrest in 
Palestine. Abdullah's stance with Iran against the peace accords keeps Saudi Arabia both 
in the Arab political mainstream and demonstrates a unified Muslim front versus Israel 
278 See for example, "Iran: Radio Commentary on US Influence in Oil Production," 14 May 
2000, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in FBIS, IAP20000514000048, 14 May 2000; and "Paper 
Views US Defense Secretary's Mideast Tour, End of US 'Hegemony,'" Al-Quds al-Arabi, 16 November 
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279 See for example, "Iraqi Paper Views Saudi Oil Role," Al-Qadisivah, 9 March 1999, in FBIS, 
FTS19990314000375, 9 March 1999; and "US Military Presence in Gulf Viewed," Al-'Arab al-'Alamivah, 
18 May 2000, in FBIS, GMP20000518000072, 18 May 2000. 
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and the United States.281 Overall, if it is not tremendously important to the Saudi 
regime's economic recovery and stability, the improvement in ties with Iran at least 
bolsters the regime's sovereignty and Islamic legitimacy by symbolically demonstrating 
the kingdom's independence from US control. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Saudi-Iranian detente has removed 
both Iranian ideological and operational support for Shi"ah dissidents within the 
kingdom. The Saudi Wahhabi sect of Islam fundamentally regards Shi'ism as blasphemy 
and therefore the Saudi Shi*ah have traditionally looked to Iran for support and guidance. 
Because of poor treatment of the Sin ah minority, Saudi Arabia has incurred various 
Iranian inspired and or supported Shi'ah uprisings. Allegedly, the most recent of these 
incidents was the bomb attack on the US barracks in Dhahran in 1996, which killed 
nineteen service members. While the United States has remained insistent on Iranian 
involvement in the bombing from the beginning, and despite steady evidence of Iranian 
involvement, Saudi Arabia consistently drifts further and further from their initial 
accusations against Iran.282 The drastic improvement in their relations since the 1996 
attack spawns speculation concerning a Saudi-Iranian Khobar cover-up in exchange for a 
cessation of Iranian support for the Saudi Shi'ah opposition and for help in tracking down 
remaining members hiding in Iran.283 While remaining unproven at the official level, 
281 "Saudi Arabia, Iran Issue Joint Communique," SPA, 19 May 1999, in FBIS, LD1905182899, 
19 May 1999. 
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such findings seem highly probable and are in line with the traditional Saudi preference 
of accommodation over confrontation. 
Ironically, while the cover-up may help provide domestic stability to Saudi Arabia 
and is an indication Iran is placing their national interests above ideological goals, the 
United States is steadily moving forward to prove Iran's involvement. CBS News 
reported in February 2001, that the FBI is preparing to issue a final report to the new 
Bush administration linking Iran to the incident.284 If conclusive, this report may lead to 
US indictments against those Iranian officials involved and or a military response in 
retribution.285 Unless Saudi Arabia openly allies with the United States on the subject, 
which is unlikely given recent statements and the progressive nature of their relations, 
Iran will not reinitiate support for domestic opposition forces in Saudi Arabia. Given the 
emphasis Iran places upon the rapprochement, the Saudi regime may rest assured Iranian 
sponsored opposition groups will not bother them. 
The detente between the two countries also provides a link between the Sunni 
Wahhabi and Shi'ah cultures promoting peaceable relations and defusing Shi'ah 
discontent. Byman and Green concur that the rapprochement helps foster a "diminution 
in conflict" between the two sects within Saudi Arabia.286 Saudi Arabia's appointment of 
a Shfah as ambassador to Iran was a sure sign of their placation or accommodation of 
Shi" ah on both sides of the Gulf. Therefore, while Washington may press for answers that 
could hurt Saudi-Iranian relations, Saudi Arabia's relations with Iran continue to improve 
their domestic stability. By bolstering the Saudi economy, enhancing the regime's 
legitimacy, eliminating Iranian support for domestic Shi'ah terrorists, and by bridging the 
284
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gap between the Sunni and Shi'ah sects within the kingdom, the Saudi-Iranian detente is 
a boon to Saudi stability. 
D.        REGIONAL STABILITY 
The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran also holds substantial 
implications for regional stability outside of just securing their own domestic situations. 
First, the detente breaks Iran's regional isolation, which in the past contributed 
significantly to regional tensions and conflict. Iran's reemergence reduces tensions and 
improves overall inter-Gulf relations. Having overcome the divide in its relations with 
Gulf-leader Saudi Arabia, Iran's relations with the other sheikdoms continue to improve. 
Second, the Saudi-Iranian detente fosters a potential framework for meaningful inter-Gulf 
discussions on such important issues as collective security. Finally, the Saudi-Iranian 
detente may affect the United States' role in maintaining regional stability. In lessening 
regional tensions and developing a force to balance Iraq, the Saudi-Iran alliance may 
inspire the host nations to ask the United States to withdraw its forces. While at present 
this an unlikely development, improving relations among the region's leaders warrant a 
prudent approach considering this possibility. 
1. Iran's Reemergence and Reduced Tensions 
Iran faced isolation in the past, but it is now reemerging and gaining an increasing 
role in regional affairs. Before Khatami's election, Iran's religious differences, -size, 
military power, and revolutionary ideology tended to frighten its smaller Gulf neighbors. 
These fears created tension between the Gulf states and Iran. As a result, they tried to 
exclude Iran from regional matters by forming Arab alliances and pacts, such as the 
GCC. These coalitions only further isolated Iran by turning seemingly bilateral issues 
into Arab versus Persian regional disputes.287 Iran learned the consequences of the Arab 
states siding with one another on several occasions, the foremost being the Iran-Iraq War 
and its on-going disagreement with the GCC over the Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands. The 
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Iran-Iraq War left an indelible impression upon Iran that it was cornered in the region. 
This isolation, whether self-imposed by Iran's own revolutionary ideology and policies or 
imposed merely by Arab fears, contributed to poor inter-Gulf relations and stability. For 
example, Iran's immediate regional and international isolation after the fall of the shah 
contributed to the devastating eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Hooman Peimani points to this in 
his study of Iran, asserting the republic's seclusion both contributed to Saddam's decision 
to invade it and to the prolongation of the subsequent war.288 While creating actual 
security problems, Iran's regional isolation additionally served as a constant irritant to 
deeply nationalist Iranians. Iranians saw Arab policies as ethnocentric and nationalistic. 
These forces fostered constant regional tension. In response to the exclusionary policies 
of the Arab Gulf states, Iran lashed out by denouncing the various sheikdoms, supporting 
opposition groups, and prolonging the Iran-Iraq War. These acts in turn fostered GCC 
counter-statements, support for Iranian opposition movements, and an increased reliance 
upon foreign protection. In the end, it became a circle of Iranian isolation, Arab-Iranian 
infighting, and further Iranian isolation. 
Today, however, the Saudi-Iranian detente is the centerpiece of their joint efforts 
to eliminate tensions and break the cycle that destabilized the region in the past.289 Since 
the beginning of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, both sides have promoted the positive 
effects their accord has upon the region.290 Khatami's opening of Iran and his promotion 
of "dialogue" versus ideological rhetoric undoubtedly did the most to lessen tensions in 
the region. Without Saudi Arabia's commensurate steps at detente, however, it is 
doubtful Iran could reemerge on the regional scene as quickly as it has. While in the past 
it was Saudi Arabia that led efforts to isolate Iran, the kingdom now leads efforts to bring 
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Iran back into the Gulf political mainstream. As the largest and most oil-rich of the Gulf 
sheikdoms, Saudi Arabia holds tremendous sway. Saudi Arabia's acceptance of Iran's 
overtures, therefore, opens the doors of rapprochement (even wider in some cases) to the 
smaller Gulf countries.291 Consequently, Iran's relations with Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and 
even Bahrain and UAE are improving. The blossoming of these countries' bilateral 
relations with Iran are a clear sign of an overall regional shift in Arab-Iranian relations 
inspired by the Saudi-Iranian detente.292 
Besides Saudi Arabia, Kuwait leads the way among GCC states in improving its 
ties with Iran. Over the course of the last year, Kuwait and Iran reconciled their 
differences and established closer relations in several areas. On the subject of security, 
Iran and Kuwait signed a far-reaching domestic security cooperation deal in October 
2000.293 This accord will benefit both sides in comabatting drug-traffiking and domestic 
terrorism. In Kuwaiti-Iranian trade relations there were several developments. Despite 
disagreements over Gulf oil drilling rights in May 2000, Kuwait and Iran resolved the 
issue peaceably and within a year the two were close to concluding a formal agreement 
demarcating their boundaries.294 Iran and Kuwait also concluded an "important" labor 
agreement in January 2001.295 The two countries in February 2001 also unveiled an 
ambitious $2 billion plan to build a 540 kilometer pipeline to supply Kuwait with 200 
million liters of fresh drinking water per day from northern Iran.296 These agreements 
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demonstrate Kuwait, like Saudi Arabia, is leaving their previous disputes with Iran in the 
past. Indeed, Kuwait's Foreign Minister remarked, "friendship and cooperation with Iran 
are the cornerstone of [Kuwait's] national policy."297 
Iran's relations with Oman and Qatar, while historically good, also continue to 
improve. Oman's "historical and long-standing" bilateral relations with Iran steadily 
improve with diplomatic visits, joint military operations, and increasing trade 
relations.298 Iran and Oman discussions in these fields focus upon improving cooperation 
in energy, the private sector, and the transit of goods through their north-south corridor as 
well as regional and international security issues.299 Like Oman, Qatar's relations with 
Iran remain strong, focusing on improving trade and investment opportunities between 
the two nations.300 These relations remained firm even despite a short-lived November 
2000 dispute within the OIC over Qatar's relations with Israel. Ironically, the dispute 
demonstrated the power of Saudi-Iranian relations when both countries threatened to 
boycott Qatar's hosting of the OIC meeting over the issue.301 The combined influence of 
the two nations quickly forced Qatar to sever its trade relations with Israel as a 
demonstration of the newfound Islamic unity in the region.302 
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Iran's relations with Bahrain and UAE, although troubled in the past, remain on a 
path towards ultimate reconciliation. Bahrain, who has been at odds with Iran for over 
twenty-years, is steadily improving its relations with Tehran - although in much smaller 
increments than the other states. The discussions between Iran and Bahrain represent a 
"new stage," according to Bahrain's Commerce Minister, in their bilateral cooperation 
based on "good neighborly relations, mutual respect, and non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs."303 Discussions between the two only focus upon cultural, artistic, and 
academic exchanges and bilateral trade relations.304 As part of this effort, they formed the 
Iran-Bahrain Joint Cooperation Council to study ways of expanding economic 
cooperation between the two nations.305 Economic cooperation is the strong point in Iran 
and UAE's somewhat troubled relations. Despite Iran and UAE's dispute over the gulf 
islands, they remain one of each other's largest trading partners.306 This creates a rather 
unique relationship where verbal diplomatic exchanges shift back and forth; one day 
condemning each other's actions concerning the Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands, while the 
next day commending expansion of trade relations.307 Interestingly, by refusing to allow 
their dispute with Iran to interfere with trade; UAE demonstrates the importance they 
attach to their relations with Iran. With respect to the Saudi role in the UAE-Iran dispute, 
the Saudis refuse to let the dispute derail their relations with Iran, which it feels will 
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lessen overall regional tensions.308 On several occasions the Saudis refused to let the 
dispute break up the GCC. This approach, while disconcerting to UAE, is for the best. 
The Saudi stance provides links promoting continued discussion that ensure Iran's 
inclusion in regional matters. The Saudi-Iranian detente may one day produce initiatives 
directed toward settling the UAE-Iran dispute.309 
Only with respect to Iraq, does the Saudi-Iranian detente (and that with other Gulf 
states) increase tensions. Iraq fears Saudi Arabia and Iran aim to counter its influence in 
the region. Comments from Baghdad routinely allege there exists a larger alliance of Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States intent on destroying Iraq.310 Iraq even cited 
Iran's April 2001 retaliatory surface-to-surface missile strike, against Iranian oppositions 
groups operating out of Iraq, as part of larger US-Saudi led offensive against their 
country. They pointed especially to the attack's coincidence with the signing of the Saudi- 
Iranian security agreement.311 Although such a diverse alliance is not likely in the near 
future, Iraq has legitimate concerns regarding, at a minimum, the closeness between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Although publicly discounting any threat from Iraq, Saudi and 
Iranian officials know the basis of their relations is partly an underlying and unspoken 
desire to contain Saddam Hussein. Saddam for his part refuses to improve relations with 
either Saudi Arabia or Iran - continuing to threaten both states.312 Given such actions, it 
308
 "Saudi Interior Minister: Iran Agreement "Nothing To Do" With UAE Islands," 26 April 
2001, SPA, in FBIS, GMP20010426000143, 26 April 2001. 
309
 "Article Hails Saudi-Iranian Security Agreement, Faults US Attitude," Al-Madinah, 26 April 
2001, in FBIS, GMP20010429000146, 26 April 2001. 
310
 See for example, "Paper Sees 'New US Plot' Against Iraq in Saudi, Kuwaiti, Iranian Moves," 
Al-Jumhurivah, 24 April 2001, in FBIS, GMP20010424000053, 24 April 2001; and "Paper Criticizes Iran, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia Stand On Iraq," Al-Iraq. 23 May 2000, in FBIS, GMP20000528000186, 23 May 
2000. 
311
 "Iraqi Writer Sees in Iran Attack Signal for Rapprochement With US, Saudi Arabia," A_. 
Thawrah, 20 April 2001, in FBIS, GMP20010420000154, 20 April 2001. 
312
 See for example, "Iraq Calls for Overthrow of Saudi Monarchy," Middle East Times. 22 
January   2001.   Available   [On-line]:   <http://metimes.com/2Kl/issue2001-/reg/iraq_calls_for.htm>   [26 
91 
is unlikely either Saudi Arabia or Iran will be able to achieve a break through in their 
relations with Iraq. Whether the detente may incline Iraq to seek its own balancing 
alliances, with perhaps UAE or Syria, or open negotiations with both countries warrants 
close observation. In this respect, the new security dynamics that Saudi-Iranian relations 
establish and their affect on Iraq's posture warrants close observation. 
2. Regional Security Framework 
The Saudi-Iranian detente does more than relieve regional tensions and improve 
trade and diplomatic relations. The warmer inter-Gulf relations the detente helps foster 
may also provide a framework for solidifying those relations into an actual security 
agreement. There are increasing indications improving inter-Gulf relations may 
potentially provide a framework or forum for regional cooperation and dialogue on 
various issues including security. To achieve a stable peace in the region without undue 
US involvement, several prominent US scholars and diplomats have called for 
cooperative agreements to confront common issues among all the Gulf nations. Critics 
argue the widely held belief that only by reintegrating Iran back into the politics of the 
region can the GCC and the United States achieve stability in the Gulf.313 This is the 
same argument Iran has made since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. The United States itself 
recognizes Iran's importance to regional affairs and encourages regional discussions. 
Some in the United States also study the ability of Iran to act as a counter-balance to 
Iraq.314 Notably, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright incorporated all these themes in 
her March 2000 speech before the American-Iranian Council: 
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There is no question that Iran's future direction will play a pivotal role in 
the economic and security affairs of what much of the world reasonably 
considers the center of the world. ...We welcome efforts to make [the Gulf 
region] less dangerous and would encourage regional discussions aimed 
at reducing tensions and building trust.... Both [the United States and 
Iran] have a stake in preventing further Iraqi aggression.... The United 
States recognizes Iran's importance in the Gulf.... We look toward Iran 
truly fulfilling its promises to serve as an 'anchor of stability'.. ,315 
As a result, consideration of Iran as a potential partner in regional defense is 
slowly growing among the members of the GCC. Despite Saddam Hussein's defeat by 
coalition forces ten years ago, Iraqi threats and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) still are the dominant concerns of the GCC. Although Iraq disputes much of the 
West's claims about its aggressive policies, Baghdad continues to present an aggressive 
posture. In January 2001, Ba'ath party newspapers again challenged Kuwait's 
sovereignty and called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, saying "now more than 
ever [the Saudi people] are aware the time has come to get rid of this backward 
regime."316 Iraq's continuous threats and posturing have made the overtures from Iran all 
the more noticeable to the Gulf states. While the GCC still holds Iraq with a certain 
degree of fear and suspicion, it increasingly perceives Iran to be benign. The Gulf states, 
in the words of the Saudi Defense Minister, "neither feel threatened by nor fear Iran."317 
Such GCC member statements are increasingly unnecessary, as inter-Gulf relations are 
progressing to the point of actual bilateral domestic security agreements promising 
formal cooperation with Iran in combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized 
crime. 
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Despite their vastly improved bilateral relations with Iran, collectively and 
individually the GCC and its member are not ready to sign more comprehensive military 
security agreements. Iran, however, continues to call for such agreements as the only 
solution to establish lasting regional security.318 Overall, the Arab sheikdoms want to 
wait longer before entering into collective security agreements with Iran. Saudi Arabia 
and Oman cite such agreements with Iran as premature. That is generally the consensus 
around the region. Dismissing reports of a pending GCC-Iran security agreement, Arab 
sources cited as reasons Iran's still unstable domestic politics and the opinion that "Gulf- 
Iranian relations have not yet reached a satisfactory stage of strength, maturity, and 
mutual trust."319 GCC-Iranian agreements of such magnitude are unlikely in the offing 
regardless, since the members themselves find it difficult to agree on security matters. In 
fact, until December 2000, the GCC remained without its own formal defensive 
agreement - almost twenty years after its founding.320 Although, a substantial increase in 
Iraqi belligerency combined with a further deterioration the Arab-Israeli situation and 
ineffective US policies might speed up the process. 
The largest sticking point to the improvement of inter-Gulf relations and the 
rapprochement with Iran is the on-going UAE-Iran dispute over the Abu Musa and Tunbs 
Islands. The GCC continues to affirm UAE's right to the islands and insists an 
international court hear the case.321 Iran, nevertheless, continues to insist the matter is 
simply a "misunderstanding" and that the islands "beyond question" belong to them.322 
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Having made several unrequited visits to UAE to discuss the issue, Iranian officials 
dismiss the GCC solution and insist they will only settle through bilateral talks with 
UAE. Tehran sees no reason why the dispute should stall closer relations. UAE although 
asserts the dispute is "an obstacle to any security deal for the region."323 More 
disturbingly, UAE is also playing Iraq against the growing Saudi-Iranian relations to gain 
an advantage in their dispute over the Islands.324 They have additionally undertaken 
major upgrades of their armed forces, including the purchase of Russian ballistic missiles 
and 80 US F-16 fighters.325 Iran in turn undertook its own military modernization 
program by increasing its 2001 defense budget by 22 percent and by discussing $7 billion 
worth of arms deals with Russia.326 Saudi Arabia remains united with the rest of the GCC 
regarding the islands, but its growing relations with Iran have strained its ties with UAE. 
Despite this, analysts still feel the disagreement will not likely preclude continued Saudi- 
Iranian overtures.327 Saudi Arabia does not want to see the island dispute widen and spoil 
the Gulf-wide rapprochement. Therefore, Saudi Arabia will remain the balancer between 
Iran and UAE to ensure the quarrel is contained. 
3. US Presence 
Finally, improving ties between the GCC states and Iran may also hold a major 
implication for the continued presence of US forces in the region. This may have long 
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range affects on regional stability. As Iran continues to espouse peace and improve its 
relations with various Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, it eliminates one the main 
justifications for maintaining US forces in the region. While the Soviet threat to the Gulf 
has past, Iran remains a perceived threat to the Gulf and its oil supplies. This threat serves 
as a major rationale for deploying US forces and granting a budget priority to the Middle 
East.328 Certainly, Iran's past rhetoric and actions perpetuated those circumstances and 
thus helped justify the United States' role in the region. Today, however, Iran is shifting 
course and changing its strategy in this area. Iran realizes its past attempts to force 
changes in its neighbors' policies were the cause of much of its economic and diplomatic 
troubles. Iran further realizes that by removing the threats and the tension, it not only can 
improve its economic situation, but it also removes one of the main justifications the Gulf 
states have for maintaining US forces in the region.329 
To that end, Iran is working diligently to lessen tensions and convince Gulf 
leaders that US forces are no longer necessary. "Iran is trying hard," writes Peimani, "to 
eliminate any excuse for non-regional, such as US, forces to justify their long-term stay 
in the region."330 This "peace offensive" is intimately intertwined in Iran's overtures to 
the various Gulf states. At every opportunity Iranian officials throughout the regime, 
from Khameini to Khatami, announce Iran's good intentions and the destabilizing effects 
foreign forces have upon the region. Iranian's Defense Minister set forth Iran's 
objectives saying: 
On the basis of the principle that collective security is the best guarantee 
for the region's security, we oppose the foreign presence in the region. 
Our call for the departure of the US forces from the Persian Gulf is based 
on our long-term view that foreign presence in the region could provide a 
shaky and non-permanent balance for a short period of time.... We urge 
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our neighbors to have closer and sincere cooperation in order to achieve 
[long-term stability]. In our view, security is an issue of psychology and 
therefore we have to remove the barriers and misunderstanding through 
cooperation, mutual respect, and non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs...Western countries have effectively helped increase tension and 
insecurity in the region. Iran believes that cooperation and solidarity are 
the best way for ensuring security.331 
Statements like this and Iran's openness, improving trade relations, blossoming 
democracy, moderate leaders, and sheer willingness to work together for regional 
stability are disarming its neighbors. Therefore, while the United States continues to warn 
the Gulf states of Iran's potential threat, these warnings fall on deaf ears. Many Arabs 
increasingly see those warnings as "artificially induced" and or "exaggerated."332 
Meanwhile, opposition to US policies in the region grows. Gulf Arabs particularly protest 
US support for Israel, its continued bombing of Iraq, and its military presence in the 
region.333 As a result, Iran's view of the United States as a destabilizing force in the 
region is gaining more support, at least among the average citizens. 
If the view of Iran as benign and the United States as destablizing continues to 
gain support, then slowly Gulf leaders may adopt the view that the US presence is no 
longer in their "best interests," especially given the challenges it presents to their 
regimes'  legitimacy and popularity.334 Adam Tarock asserts the Gulf states "have 
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concluded that [the GCC and Iran] are of equal weight and have thus embraced detente as 
the best way for maintaining security and stability in the Persian Gulf."335 Therefore, if 
the perception that Iran is an equal and no longer a threat also becomes widely held, then 
the perceived justification for US forces to remain may cease to exist. This could lead to 
requests by various Gulf governments for the United States to reduce or withdraw its 
forces from the region. 
Despite these developments, however, the Gulf states are unlikely to make drastic 
changes to their security structure in the immediate future. The GCC, by several 
accounts, is not capable of defending itself should either Iraq or Iran decide to attack.336 
Disparities and differences in command and control systems, equipment, and national 
priorities prevent the GCC from forming a truly effective military alliance capable of 
deterring Iran or Iraq.337 The GCC is aware of this fact and, according to Geoffrey Kemp, 
"knows full well that their defense in the last resort depends on the United States, and this 
will require a continued forward American military presence."338 Additionally, no Arab 
country wants to be beholden unto Iran for protection. Even Iranian scholar Hooshang 
Amirahmadi admits, "For [the Gulf States], Iran's participation in a security system 
means exchange of information, cooperation in matters of security, and increased 
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economic and routine regional political interaction."339 Finally, US relations with key 
host nations remain strong and will remain so for the near future.340 
E.        SUMMARY 
The detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran holds special significance for the 
United States. The United States, as the largest consumer of petroleum products in world, 
has a profound concern for the continued flow of affordable oil from the Persian Gulf. No 
two Persian Gulf countries control the flow and price of oil more than Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Their newfound solidarity, especially within OPEC, allows them to impact oil 
production and pricing in unprecedented ways. OPEC's lower production levels, 
increased quota discipline, and price band will ensure oil and gasoline prices remain 
above previous levels. This will impact the world's economy, as it has the US economy, 
by lowering economic growth. Should higher prices continue to impact the United State's 
economy, tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia will increase. Despite the 
troubles higher energy costs entail, they nevertheless benefit the Persian Gulf region by 
stabilizing its faltering economies. Higher prices equate to increased revenues for all the 
Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. These revenues help salvage their failing 
economies in the short term as their governments try to implement economic reforms. 
Saudi and Iranian domestic stability benefits tremendously from improved economic 
conditions and their stability is vital to the entire region. The Saudi-Iranian detente also 
directly affects regional security by bringing Iran back into the politics of the Gulf. This, 
in turn, affects inter-Gulf relations and prospects for both establishing a regional security 
framework and continuing the US military presence in the region. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS 
The detente between the two regional powers Saudi Arabia and Iran has vast 
implications for the United States, the region, and global oil production and pricing. The 
rapid improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations after twenty years of hostile relations is 
unprecedented. The forces enabling and driving the rapprochement, however, are clear. 
To understand just how far Saudi Arabia and Iran have come in their relations it is 
essential to know where they began. Saudi Arabia and Iran are vastly different nations. 
They have different historical backgrounds, geography, and natural resources. Their 
people practice similar, yet different versions of Islam and they are ethnically and 
culturally unlike one another. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia and Iran's political systems 
and ideological principles are almost in complete opposition to one another. These 
disparities were overwhelming in the past. Because of these differences, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran suffered nearly twenty years of cold, even hostile, relations. During this period, 
each regime openly and covertly sought the downfall of the other. As a result, the region 
suffered wars, conspiracies, bombings, and unrelenting political tension and instability. 
Although relations seem to be on a new path, they remain heavily influenced by these 
factors and their past relations. 
Despite their differences and a history of poor relations, Saudi Arabia and Iran are 
seeking common ground for improved relations in numerous areas. This cooperation is 
the result of several contributing and or driving factors such as: 
• the   election   of   moderate   president   Khatami's   and   the   subsequent 
consolidation of and elite consensus over foreign and oil policies; 
• the increased power of Crown Prince Abdullah and his focus upon regional 
issues and reforming the economy; 
• the failure of the US "Dual Containment" policy to remove Saddam Hussein 
or collapse/change Iran's revolutionary regime; and 
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the collapse of the Middle East Peace Accords and the perceived failure of the 
United States to pressure Israel into settling the matter. 
While the above political enablers or factors support the detente, it is the severe economic 
decline and its repercussions upon the domestic political stability of both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia that is the driving force in their rapprochement. Both countries suffer from major 
economic problems such as exceptionally high unemployment, poor economic growth, 
growing foreign and domestic debts, severe annual budget deficits, and economies that 
are overly dependent upon petroleum production and in need of reform. These conditions 
demand a change in the way Saudi Arabia and Iran approach matters of state. Pragmatic 
economic policies designed to maximize oil revenues and salvage both nations' 
deteriorating economies are the basis of the Saudi-Iranian detente and are accelerating its 
growth. 
The detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran holds special significance for the 
United States. The United States, as the largest consumer of petroleum products in world, 
wants affordable oil from the Persian Gulf. No two Persian Gulf countries have more 
control over that oil than Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their newfound solidarity, especially 
within OPEC, allows them to. affect oil production and pricing in unprecedented ways. 
The result of this cooperation is the highest oil prices in decades. Additionally, OPEC's 
lower production levels, increased quota discipline, and price bands will ensure oil and 
gasoline prices remain above the previous levels. This impacts the world's economy, as it 
has the US economy, by slowing economic growth. Should higher prices continue to 
impact the United State's economy, tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
will increase. Despite the troubles higher energy costs entail, they benefit the Persian 
Gulf region by stabilizing its faltering economies. Higher prices equate to increased 
revenues for the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is salvaging their 
failing economies in the short term while their governments try to implement economic 
reforms. Saudi and Iranian domestic stability benefits from improved economic 
conditions and their stability is vital to the entire region. The Saudi-Iranian detente also 
102 
directly affects regional security by bringing Iran meaningfully back into the politics of 
the Gulf. Iran's reemergence on the Gulfs political landscape in turn affects inter-Gulf 
relations. Iran is establishing closer relations throughout the region, defusing past 
animosities, and disarming potential foes. Iran's "charm offensive" increases prospects 
for establishing a regional security framework involving the GCC states and Iran. Should 
this occur, the continued US military presence in the region may ultimately come under 
increased scrutiny by its Arab hosts. 
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APPENDIX 
ABBREVIATED CHRONOLOGY OF SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
(1979-2001) 
The following is an abbreviated chronology of Saudi-Iranian relations. It focuses 
upon the major events that occurred between them that affected their relations or the 



















Revolutionaries   depose   Iran's   monarch   and   establish   Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
Seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Saudis suspect Iranian 
influences were responsible.  
Saudi Shiites protest US forces in Saudi Arabia and denounce the 
royal family - 24 killed, thousands arrested. Saudis see Iranian hand 
in protests.  
Iraq invades Iran with tacit Saudi support. 
US-Saudi AWACs support package approved to provide protection 
against Iran. 
Establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to counter 
Iraqi and Iranian threats.  
Saudis, using US AWACs support, shoot down two Iranian fighters. 
Saudi Arabia helps Iraq export oil past Iranian blockades by allowing 
them to use Saudi pipelines. __  
Saudis step up oil production - waging economic warfare on Iran's 
oil markets. Iran's oil revenue drops from $21.8 billion in 1982-84 to 
only S6.9 billion in 1986-87.  
Saudis encourage Kuwaitis to request US intervention in Iran-Iraq 
"tanker war" which "internationalizes" the war - leading to US- 
Iranian naval confrontations and the eventual US downing of an 
Iranian airliner in 1988. 
Iranians attending Hajj in Mecca clash with Saudi forces attempting 
to stop their political demonstration - 450 killed.  
Saudis sever relations with Iran over 1987 Hajj - limiting Iran to only 
45,000 pilgrims per year. Iranians boycott future pilgrimages.  
Iran-Iraq War ends. 
Two bomb explosions near Grand Mosque in Mecca attributed to 
Shiites and Iran - Saudi-Iranian relations deteriorate further. 
Death of Khomeini and subsequent attenuation of vehement 
ideological rhetoric and advocacy for spreading revolution to Gulf 
States. 
Gulf War - Iran does not get involved in war - gaining favor of Gulf 
States for its impartiality. Saudis see opportunity to improve relations 
with Iran.  
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DATE EVENT 
03/1991 Saudi Arabia and GCC consider security agreement with Syria and 
Egypt called the Damascus Declaration or the "6+2" plan. Iran sees 
the agreement as an attempt to isolate it.  
06/1991 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal visits Tehran to allay 
Iranian fears over the Damascus Declaration and to discuss separate 
Saudi-Iranian framework for cooperation on Gulf, Islamic, and 
economic issues and on GCC-Iranian security matters.  
06/1991 Saudi-Iranian relations restored. Saudi Arabia allows 115,000 
Iranians to attend Hajj yearly. Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati 
attends Hajj with other pilgrims.  
04/1992 Iran claims sovereignty over Abu Musa despite 1971 accord with 
UAE establishing joint control. UAE protests and additionally 
revitalizes issue of Iranian 1971 seizure of Tunbs Islands. 
1992 Iranian   Ayatollah  Khamenei   fatwa  against   Shiite  protesting  or 
offending Sunnis during upcoming Hajj. 1992 Hajj is uneventful. 
1992 Border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar - Iran supports Qatar 
and warms relations. Saudis see Iran as trying to split GCC.  
12/1992    | GCC summit condemns Iranian actions on Abu Musa and discuss 
  plans to implement "6+2" plan.  
1993  IS establishes "Dual Containment" policy vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq. 
01/1993 Oil prices slide to 5 year low - hurting Iran and leading them to 
accuse Saudis of over-production. Saudis respond with counter 
accusations of Iranian over-production.  
NA      03/1993      Iran  makes overtures towards Iraq - reportedly assisting Iraq in 
breaking embargo and denouncing US air strikes.  
05/199; Saudis crack down on Iranian "political" demonstrations at 1993 Hajj 
and Iran protests - Saudi-Iranian relations suffer temporary setback. 
09/199: Tehran and Riyadh compromise over oil production to present a 
united OPEC front. 
Saudis reach compromise with internal Shiite dissidents, negotiations 
(u er Abu Musa and Tunbs proceed.  
10/1993      "(>-2" plan languishes under GCC indifference and improving Iranian 
relations. 
G 01/1994 Saudi King Fadh sends personal emissary to Iranian President 
i Rafsanjani. Tehran responds to OPEC cooperation and Saudi 
■ overtures warmly - emphasizing cooperation.  
02/1994 Saudi-Iranian "honeymoon'.' over as both sides bicker over oil prices 
and production quotas.  
1994 Iran forcibly seizes Abu Musa Island from UAE. 
03/1994 OPEC meeting - Iran fails to get further cuts in Saudi production. 
1991-1996 Continued   Iranian   strikes   in   Iraq   against   Iranian   and   Kurdish 
dissident groups operating from bases in Iraq.  
1994 Yemeni Civil War - Saudis back south secessionist forces that lose. 
Iran criticizes Saudis for intervention  
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DATE 
NA      02/1994 







«aiasl    03/1995 
05/1995 
NA      09/1995 
12/1995 
995-1996    Renewed Bahraini Shiite violence. 









Iraqi delegation visits Tehran, however bomb explodes in Iran and 
Tehran accuses Iraq of supporting Iranian dissidents.  
Iran accused of stirring discontent. 
Iran strengthens positions on Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands - building 
power plant on Greater Tunbs and a port and airfield on Abu Musa. 
Bomb explodes in Bahrain - Iran accused of supporting such attacks. 
Iranian delegation visits Baghdad. Warming between two countries 
becoming stronger. 
Iraqi delegation visits Tehran to discuss outstanding issues from Iran- 
Iraq War-POWs2_bordej^1etcli:  
Terrorists bomb the OPM/SANG building in Riyadh. Saudis initially 
point to external terrorists, however four Saudis are eventually 
captured who have no connection to Iran. 
Qatari ruler walks out of GCC meeting in protest to appointment of 
Saudi Secretary-General.       _____  
Prince Sultan comments that Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two most 
important Islamic nations and that their Islamic beliefs unite them 
despite their sectarian differences. Iran receives the comments 
warmly.  
Iran rejects GCC proposal to resolve Abu Musa/Tunbs Islands issue 
thru the International Court of Justice.   
NA      05/1996      OPM/SANG terrorists executed. 
Bahrain withdraws ambassador from Tehran in protest of alleged 
Iranian support to Shiite uprisings. 
Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Iran immediately 
implicated by Saudi investigators, but no hard evidence found. US 
leaning towards retaliation if Iranians implicated.  
07/1996    | King  Fadh,  in  aside  comments  to  Iran's  ambassador,  calls  for 
increased bilateral ties with Iran.   
Saudi and Iranian Commerce Ministries meet and agree to expand 
economic cooperation, including the exchange of delegations, trade 
shows, and joint ventures in the private sector. 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati visits Riyadh to invite King Fadh 
to Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) summit in Iran in 
December. 
President Rafsanjani  and  Crown Prince Abdullah meet at OIC 
summit in Pakistan and discuss improving relations.  
GCC expresses their readiness to open warmer relations with Iran. 
Iran conducts Operation "Road to Jerusalem' 
Gulf military exercise ever conducted by Iran. 
the largest Persian 
Khatami elected president in Iran and asks for "an opening of a new 
page" in bilateral relations - receives congratulations from Fadh.  
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G 07/1997 Saudi Minister of State delivers personal messages of King Fadh and 
Crown Prince Abdullah to Tehran. 
G 1997 Saudi executives visit Tehran to sign "economic cooperation accords" 
with Iranian companies. 
G 08/1997 Renewed airline traffic between Iran and Saudi Arabia - first since 
1979. 
GCC Secretary General reports that Iran is not a threat to its Arab 
neighbors and improved relations were good for the stability of the 
region. 
G 11/1997 Iran's Foreign Minister, Kharrazi, conducts talks with Saudi Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Fisal at the U.N. and later with King Fadh and 
Crown Prince Abdullah in Riyadh. 
G 12/1997 Iran hosts OIC - events demonstrate definite warming between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. Prince Abdullah meets with both President 
Khatami and Ayatollah Khamenei - the first such meetings since 
1979. Khatami elected leader of the OIC for three years. 
G 02/1998 Former Iranian President Rafsanjani visits Saudi Arabia for 10 days 
with blessing of Ayatollah Khamenei - first visit to Saudi Arabia by 
high level Iranian official. Talks discuss improving bilateral relations 
and plans for increasing security in the region through joint efforts. 
G Iran's Oil Minister travels to Saudi Arabia with Rafsanjani. Together 
they petition Riyadh to cut oil production to raise prices from their 
S12 a barrel low. Talks between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other OPEC 
and non-OPEC members, lead to a series of production cuts in mid- 
1998. 
G 1998 President Khatami tells Iranian pilgrims to refrain from political 
demonstrations. Saudis increase Iranian Hajj quota. 
G 03/1998 Iranian warship visits Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
G 05/1998 Saudis absolve Iran of any involvement in Khobar bombing. 
Allegations arise of a Saudi-Iranian conspiracy to cover up Iranian 
involvement, preventing US retaliation in turn for an end to Iranian 
support for Saudis dissidents. Act seen as a symbol of changing 
Saudi-Iranian relations. Investigation however remains open. 
G Saudi FM Prince Saud and Iranian FM Kharrazi sign a wide-reaching 
bilateral agreement promoting cooperation in the fields of trade and 
business, economy, joint investment, science, technology, culture, 
tourism, and sports. Other areas slated for bilateral cooperation 
include industries, mining, air and sea transportation links, and 
environmental protection. 
G 06/1998 OPEC cuts oil production. Saudis and Iranians lead the way cutting 












Iran successfully tests medium range missile (Shahab-3) capable of 
hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iran's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 
Mohammad Reza Nouri, in the London-based newspaper "Al-Hayat." 
Nuri told the newspaper that "Iran's missile capabilities are at the 
disposal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.... Our relations with Saudi 
Arabia have reached a historical stage where we are complementing 
one another, and if we have a missile or non-missile capability, it is at 
the kingdom's disposal."  
Intervention by Saudi Arabia and the U.N. helps to diffuse tensions 
between Iran and Afghanistan's Taleban, which had risen almost to a 
point of open conflict. 
Saudi-Iranian accord at OPEC leads to oil production cut backs. 
Saudi  Defense  Minister Prince  Sultan visits  Tehran  to  discuss 
relations and prepared for President Khatami's visit to Riyadh - first 
such high level meeting in two decades. 
President Khatami meets with King Fadh in Riyadh. Also meets with 
other major ministers and tours the country. Saudi Arabia announces 
appointment of a Shi'ah, Jameel al-Jishi, as Saudi ambassador to 
Tehran.  
UAE criticizes Saudi Arabia for warming its ties to Iran without 
forcing Iran to address the Tunbs and Abu Musa issue and walks out 
of the meeting. Iranian overtures ignite "bitter debate among Arab 
states." UAE goes so far as to threaten to suspend its membership in 
the GCC.   
Resumption of June GCC meeting calls for the establishment of a 
three country committee comprised of representatives of Oman, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the GCC secretary, who will 
arrange for direct talks between the UAE and Iran. Iran has rejects the 
committee, calling instead for unmediated bilateral talks with the 
UAE. . 
Saudi envoy delivers letter to Khatami. The letter reportedly called 
for increased collaboration in stabilizing the oil market and 
developing military cooperation in the Gulf - the first discussion of 
joint security cooperation 
OPEC continues to hold down production - keeping prices higher. 
Saudis and Iranians come to agreement over chairmanship of 
committee, but Kuwait, UAE, and Iraq protest plan - left to later date. 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard air and naval forces conduct "Courage- 
78" and "Unity 77," using their three submarines, frigates, and 
helicopters armed with anti-submarine weapons. Analysts argue such 
exercises were aimed at showing the GCC that a joint Iran-GCC 
naval capability could replace the United States as regional defense. 
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G 10/1999 Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri visits Saudi 
Arabia - the two countries agree to improve relations and coordinate 
an Islamic response to regional and world affairs. 
11/1999 Saudi Arabia holds trade fair in Tehran - the first in Tehran since the 
1979 Islamic revolution. The fair was intended to expand the 
political-economic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Some 70 
Saudi firms take part. 
G 02/2000 King Fadh invites Ayatollah Khamenei to visit Saudi Arabia 
such invitation since 1979. 
first 
04/2000      US Secretary of Defense, 
continued threat from Iran. 
William Cohen, tours 
04/2000 
GCC warning of 
GCC meeting discussing improving Iranian relations in the region. 
Iranian Defense Minister Shamkhani remarks explaining Iranian goal 
of "collective security in Gulf." 
05/2000 Reports of GCC meeting that they are not yet ready to sign or enter 
into security agreements with Iran. 
05/2000 Iranian Defense Minister visit to Saudi Arabia - "building foundation 
for improved ties." 
Saudi  Defense Minister Sultan  remarks  concerning  good  Saudi- 
Iranian ties. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran announce they will sign a security agreement 
in the near future. 
G 07/2000 
07/2000 Iran   conducts   second   successful   test   of medium 
(Shahab-3) capable of hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia. 
range  missile 
08/2000 Message from King Fadh to President Khatami to "expand bilateral 
ties. 
09/2000 GCC Meeting open dialogue over tripartite committee to resolve 
Iran-UAE dispute over Tunbs/Abu Musa. 
09/2000 Abdullah speech at UN Millennium Conference openly advocates 
Saudi-Iranian relations. 
Abdullah and Khatami meeting after UN Millennium Conference and 
discuss continuing relations. 
04/2001 Saudi Arabia and Iran sign an unprecedented security agreement 
marking the highest point in their countries' relations. 
Key:    ig = Bad event for relations, G 
Applicable  
Good event for relations, NA = Not 
Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Wallstreet Journal, CNN, BBC, FBIS, 
Strategic Forecasts, and Gulf News On-line. 
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